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  INTRODUCTION   
Enforcement of civil public law is on a precipice. Federal 
statutes in the areas of discrimination, antitrust, securities, the 
workplace, education, consumer and environmental protection, 
and more include what are known as “hybrid” enforcement 
schemes.1 Hybrid enforcement describes statutes in which Con-
gress created both public and private mechanisms for enforcing 
the law by establishing both a federal government agency and a 
private right of action with incentives to encourage citizen liti-
gation.2 Since the creation of most hybrid statutes in the 1960s, 
federal government agencies and private plaintiffs’ attorneys 
have each played their part in litigating violations of civil public 
laws.3 Over the past decade, however, each half of the hybrid en-
forcement equation has been slowly and consistently squeezed.  
On the private side, procedural jurisprudence on pleading 
standards, class action doctrine, and mandatory arbitration 
have dramatically reshaped private enforcers’ access to the fed-
eral courts.4 Meanwhile, on the public side, new levels of eco-
nomic and political pressure on legislators and executive branch 
officials, exacerbated by recent jurisprudence on political contri-
 
 1. See Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 637, 687 (2013). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See infra Part II.A; see also, e.g., Judicial Caseload Indicators - Federal 
Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
judicial-caseload-indicators-federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018 [https:// 
perma.cc/FKY4-TA2X] (showing an 8.8% decline in civil cases filed in district 
courts between 2014 and 2018).  
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butions, have shifted the federal government somewhat irre-
trievably toward deregulation.5 The hybrid systems written into 
our most important federal statutes, designed with two enforce-
ment options to ensure that individuals’ rights would be pro-
tected, are no longer able to function as Congress envisioned. 
Over the past two decades, legal scholars have focused in-
creasing attention on hybrid enforcement schemes in public law. 
A significant body of scholarship has now studied many aspects 
of each parallel track of hybrid models—for example, measuring 
the success of private incentives to litigate or theorizing optimal 
enforcement agency design.6 Some scholars argue in favor of gov-
 
 5. See infra Part II.B; see also Enforcement Annual Results Analysis and 
Trends for Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www 
.epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-annual-results-analysis-and-trends-fiscal 
-year-2017 [https://perma.cc/A7LC-2USW] (showing a nearly fifty percent drop 
in civil enforcement cases filed by the EPA, from 3,762 cases initiated in FY 
2007 to 1,938 cases initiated in FY 2017); EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 
through FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www 
.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm [https://perma.cc/4LXT 
-UVSN] (showing a general trend of decline in litigation filed by the EEOC from 
403 and 362 cases filed in FYs 2006 and 2007 to 114 and 201 cases filed in FYs 
2016 and 2017). 
 6. See infra Part I.A. The literature on public and private enforcement 
mechanisms in U.S. civil law is vast. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, ENTREPRE-
NEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL & FUTURE (2015) [hereinafter COFFEE, EN-
TREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION]; SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC 
REGULATION & PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010) [hereinafter FARHANG, 
LITIGATION STATE]; Burbank et al., supra note 1; Stephen B. Burbank & Sean 
Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 
(2014); Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. 
L. REV. 285 (2016); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: 
Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 
215 (1983) [hereinafter Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG]; David Freeman Eng-
strom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013); David 
Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from 
Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244 (2012) [hereinafter Engstrom, 
Harnessing the Private AG]; Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Re-
flections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering 
in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2000); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinvent-
ing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforce-
ment of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384 (2000) [hereinafter Gilles, Rein-
venting Structural Reform]; Myriam Gilles, Can John Coffee Rescue the Private 
Attorney General? Lessons from the Credit Card Wars, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1001 
(2016) [hereinafter Gilles, Can Coffee Rescue?]; Myriam Gilles & Gary Fried-
man, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concep-
cion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012) [hereinafter Gilles & Friedman, After Class]; 
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ernment enforcement or public oversight of private plaintiffs’ at-
torneys;7 others prefer private litigation or view public enforce-
ment bureaucracy as problematic.8 For the most part, however, 
the scholarship reflects the reality that each enforcement path 
is separate. Articles examine or argue for the dominance of ei-
ther public or private enforcement mechanisms, but start from 
the presumption that never the two shall meet.9 
The leading thread of this scholarship arose in the mid-
1980s, rooted in law and economics arguments that statutory in-
centives for private enforcement had been distorted by private 
class action attorneys who put their own profits before the inter-
ests of the clients they represented.10 Concerns for abusive class 
actions sparked a movement of “litigation reform” that laid the 
 
Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs 
Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 
(2006) [hereinafter Gilles & Freidman, Exploding the Myth]; J. Maria Glover, 
The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012); Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attor-
ney General: Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339 
(2012); Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 183 (2003); David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L. 
J. 777 (2016); William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—
And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004); Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Pri-
vate Enforcement in Administrative Courts, 72 VAND. L. REV. 425 (2019); Mi-
chael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing 
and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401 (1998); Matthew C. Stephenson, Pub-
lic Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93 (2005). 
 7. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 287–88, nn.5–7 (citing, e.g., Jaime Dodge, 
Privatizing Mass Settlement, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 335, 375 (2014); Coffee, 
Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6; Erichson, supra note 6; Rubenstein, su-
pra note 6). 
 8. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 287–88, nn. 9–11 (citing, e.g., Stephen M. 
Johnson, Sue and Settle: Demonizing the Environmental Citizen Suit, 37 SEAT-
TLE U. L. REV. 891, 906 (2014); William H. Pryor, Jr., A Comparison of Abuses 
and Reforms of Class Actions and Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TUL. L. REV. 
1885, 1909 (2000); Selmi, supra note 6). 
 9. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 285 (“[S]ubstantial literature on private 
and public enforcement . . . typically treats government agencies and private 
attorneys general as substitutes rather than complements.”); id. at 291 (describ-
ing public and private enforcement “as engaged in a zero-sum contest for en-
forcement jurisdiction”). The notable exception is Clopton’s recent work on the 
benefits of “redundant” enforcement. See generally Clopton, supra note 6. 
 10. See generally Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6; infra Part 
II.A. 
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foundation for procedural restrictions on class action doctrine.11 
More recently, the fire of litigation reform spread, inspiring U.S. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence that has intensified pleading 
standards in federal courts and increasingly compelled manda-
tory arbitration to remove claims from federal courts entirely.12 
As a result, many scholars now fear that the pendulum has 
swung too far in the other direction, limiting access to federal 
courts for all, including those seeking crucial private enforce-
ment of public law.13 
Yet while scholars have warned of the consequences of pro-
cedural jurisprudence that limits private enforcement, they have 
largely missed a simultaneous pressure being exerted on the 
public side of hybrid enforcement regimes. The same deregula-
tory instincts that spawned limitations on private class actions 
have taken greater political hold, limiting federal agency budg-
ets and threatening public enforcement, too.14 Executive branch 
preferences have always varied between Democratic and Repub-
lican presidential administrations, leading to ebbs and flows in 
the level of monetary support for regulatory enforcement.15 But 
recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence affecting campaign fi-
nancing has likely changed this natural progression.16 The Court 
has now placed its thumb on the scale in favor of unlimited cor-
porate campaign contributions and against labor union dues.17 
As a result, most legislators and executive branch appointees 
now likely feel intense pressure to limit public regulatory en-
forcement, at least for the foreseeable future.18 If, as legal schol-
ars have suggested, private enforcement litigation is “on the 
ropes,”19 political and financial support for government regula-
tory enforcement may now be down for the count. 
Both sides of hybrid public-private enforcement regimes are 
now so seriously constrained that weakened parallel enforce-
ment efforts may no longer be enough to secure crucial public 
laws. This Article seeks to offer a new approach focusing on 
 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. See infra notes 203–05 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See infra notes 254–67 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
 18. See infra Part II.B. 
 19. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 658. 
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whether and how parallel enforcement tracks can merge to form 
points of super-hybrid “co-enforcement”:20 public and private en-
forcement attorneys working together in a co-equal, collabora-
tive fashion. The term “co-enforcement” was coined by political 
scientist and labor scholar Janice Fine and her colleagues to de-
scribe workers’ organizations and government enforcement 
agencies collaborating to better enforce labor law standards for 
vulnerable workers.21 This Article looks to and adapts the con-
cept to a wider swath of public-private enforcement partner-
ships, and does so in the context of litigation. It conceives of fed-
eral public agency and private plaintiffs’ attorneys working 
together to litigate jointly a variety of public law statutes. As 
such, the Article draws from the theoretical and empirical work 
of Fine and builds upon that of legal scholars of hybrid enforce-
ment mechanisms to offer a pragmatic approach to resolve ac-
cess to justice problems.  
But this Article’s proposal is different from those of legal 
scholars who call for greater public oversight over private attor-
ney “agents” to whom public enforcement work is delegated or 
outsourced by government “principals.”22 Instead, it proposes co-
counseling arrangements in which both parties collaborate as 
equals and fund their own efforts, not to correct the excesses of 
rent-seeking private attorneys general but rather to ensure ac-
cess to justice for the public interest.23 In doing so, this Article 
seeks to respond to two urgent challenges in the enforcement of 
civil laws that protect the public. On the one hand is a well-doc-
umented decline in private individuals’ access to the courts due 
 
 20. As discussed infra notes 97–106 and accompanying text, the concept of 
“co-enforcement” is adapted from the work of Janice Fine and her colleagues, 
who coined the term to describe collaboration between workers’ organizations 
and government agencies responsible for labor law enforcement. See Janice 
Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards in Partnership with Civil Society: Can Co-en-
forcement Succeed Where the State Alone Has Failed?, 45 POL. & SOC’Y 359, 362–
63 (2017) [hereinafter Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards]; Janice Fine, New Ap-
proaches to Enforcing Labor Standards: How Co-enforcement Partnerships Be-
tween Government and Civil Society Are Showing the Way Forward, 2017 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 143, 146–47 (2018), [hereinafter Fine, New Approaches]; see also 
Seema N. Patel & Catherine L. Fisk, California Co-Enforcement Initiatives that 
Facilitate Worker Organizing, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 3–4 (2017). 
 21. See Fine, New Approaches, supra note 20; Fine, Enforcing Labor Stand-
ards, supra note 20; see also infra notes 97–106 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 107–17 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra Part III. 
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to a decade of civil procedure jurisprudence that has intensified 
pleading requirements, narrowed class action rules, and increas-
ingly embraced arbitration.24 On the other is a challenge with 
which scholars have largely yet to grapple: a new level of finan-
cial and political pressure on legislators and the executive 
branch pushing directly away from public enforcement of civil 
laws and toward deregulation.25 
While there are countless areas of overlap between civil law 
enforcement at both the state and federal levels, this Article fo-
cuses on one specific area ripe for coordination: federal statutes 
that authorize both a federal agency to enforce the statute 
against violators and individuals to enforce their own private 
rights of action for their injuries arising out of the same harms. 
This focus may include what are known as “citizen suits” or 
plaintiffs’ attorneys acting as “private attorneys general” where 
private litigation seeks to remedy both the plaintiffs’ own harm 
and deter violators.26 But it excludes both “qui tam” suits in 
which individuals stand in the shoes of the government to en-
force statutes for a bounty or reward and “parens patriae” suits 
in which the government stands in as a representative to redress 
the harms of its citizens.27 While the latter involve crossover be-
tween public and private enforcement, they are beyond this Ar-
ticle’s focus on coordination in traditional hybrid federal statu-
tory enforcement between agencies and individuals seeking to 
remedy the same harms through litigation for the purpose of ef-
fectively protecting the public. 
This Article develops an argument grounded in both theory 
and necessity for merging public and private enforcement and 
considers the potential for applying such an approach trans-sub-
stantively to a variety of federal public laws.28 Part I explores 
 
 24. See infra Part II.A. 
 25. See infra Part II.B. 
 26. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 294. 
 27. See id., at 293–95; infra Part I.B.1. 
 28. In a prior work, I documented how, in the five-year wake of the 2008 
Great Recession, both public and private mechanisms for enforcing Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became increasingly constrained, due to recession-
ary budget cuts on the public side and a “procedural recession” in private plain-
tiffs’ access to the federal courts. See Stephanie Bornstein, Rights in Recession: 
Toward Administrative Antidiscrimination Law, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 119 
(2014). I proposed a model for combining public and private Title VII enforce-
ment and using administrative procedures under existing law more robustly—
what I called “administrative antidiscrimination law.” See id.  
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the theoretical framework to support a co-enforcement litigation 
model. Is co-enforcement a sound idea in theory to meet our goals 
for how a public law enforcement system should be designed? It 
reviews political and economic theories that led to existing hy-
brid models, then applies those theories to integrated, rather 
than separate and parallel, enforcement. Part II makes the nor-
mative case for pursuing a collaborative approach. Even if co-
enforcement is sound in theory, is a change to the status quo of 
hybrid enforcement necessary? It focuses on the need to inte-
grate public and private enforcement forces due to recent eco-
nomic, political, and jurisprudential constraints on both public 
and private enforcers. Part III provides a doctrinal and practical 
framework for how such points of co-enforcement could occur. If 
hybrid integration is a sound and necessary idea, how do we ac-
tually move toward co-enforcement? It looks at examples from 
statutes that authorize hybrid enforcement and proposes how to 
foster collaborative partnerships between related federal agen-
cies and private plaintiffs’ attorney enforcers.  
Ultimately, the Article concludes, litigation reform and pro-
cedural jurisprudence have weakened private enforcement at 
the same time that a deregulatory fervor and new political pres-
sures have weakened public enforcement. To ensure that critical 
public laws are enforced adequately may now require integrat-
ing both constrained halves of the parallel hybrid enforcement 
equation. 
I.  THEORETICAL BASIS FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
CO-ENFORCEMENT   
This Part provides the theoretical basis for a proposal of 
public-private co-enforcement of public law. It asks whether a co-
enforcement approach is a good idea in theory given the goals 
behind existing hybrid enforcement design. It begins by defining 
“hybrid” enforcement for the purposes of this Article and high-
lighting existing scholarship on the political and economic theo-
ries that supported the development of hybrid enforcement 
schemes. It then considers what impact moving to integrated, 
rather than parallel and separate, enforcement would have on 
the same rationales, to provide a theoretical grounding for a co-
enforcement approach. This Part concludes with a response to 
potential theory-based counterarguments. 
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A. HYBRID ENFORCEMENT THEORY 
Drawing on the work of several legal scholars, this Section 
provides an operational definition of “hybrid” public-private en-
forcement and highlights key political and economic rationales 
that gave rise to its development in U.S. law. 
1. Defining “Hybrid” Enforcement 
To propose a framework for combining the two halves of the 
existing “hybrid” enforcement scheme requires first defining “hy-
brid” enforcement. Public and private enforcement overlaps in a 
wide array of the American legal system in both state and fed-
eral law.29 Several legal scholars have provided helpful taxono-
mies from which this Article draws. 
In a recent work, Zachary Clopton traced the long history 
and wide reach of “redundant authority,” detailing “enforcement 
schemes in which public and private actors may maintain sepa-
rate but overlapping suits seeking the same remedies for the 
same conduct” that may be “mutually preclusive.”30 Clopton 
identified a continuum with three main categories.31 On one end 
of the spectrum, he placed public actors seeking to enforce pri-
vate rights—for example, parens patriae suits brought by state 
attorneys general on behalf of their citizens against tobacco, fire-
arms, or asbestos manufacturers.32 On the other end, he placed 
private actors seeking to enforce what seem like public rights—
for example, qui tam suits under the False Claims Act brought 
by private citizens on behalf of the government against contrac-
tors engaged in fraud, for a share of the recovery.33 Here, he also 
 
 29. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 291 (identifying the “substantial and grow-
ing literature comparing public and private enforcement of law” and citing 
scholarship). Even focusing on only federal statutes that authorize private ac-
tors to sue, the field is vast. In a detailed study, Stephen Burbank, Sean Far-
hang, and Herbert Kritzer mapped 400 federal statutory enforcement schemes 
enacted between 1947 and 2002 and identified that nearly one-quarter (100) 
allowed for private enforcement and over twenty cases had “hybrid . . . regimes,” 
enacting private alongside government lawsuits or administrative actions. Bur-
bank et al., supra note 1, at 685–87. Statutes allowing private enforcement of 
government policy, they noted, may reach “a virtually limitless array of policy 
areas,” including banking, discrimination, health and safety, the environment, 
and more. Id. 
 30. Clopton, supra note 6, at 290–92. 
 31. See id. at 292. 
 32. See id. at 290 & n.3. 
 33. See id. at 294–95. Note that, as Clopton explains, this may not be a 
  
820 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:811 
 
included “citizen suits,” in which a private party sues to ensure 
legal compliance and, sometimes, monetary damages—for exam-
ple, suits to enforce voting rights, environmental or consumer 
protections, or other “common public rights.”34 In a “grey area” 
between these two extremes, Clopton placed all other “hybrids” 
that provide injured parties with a private right of action run-
ning parallel to a government entity’s enforcement efforts under 
the same statute—for example, private class actions alongside 
government litigation in areas like antitrust, securities, housing, 
and employment.35  
Other scholars focus on the role of the “private attorney gen-
eral,”36 where parties use their private rights of action to litigate 
violations of public law. In early and influential scholarship, 
John Coffee distinguished between two groups of private enforc-
ers of public law—what he called the “ideological” and the “en-
trepreneurial” private attorneys general.37 Coffee’s ideologues 
litigate mostly environmental, civil rights, and social justice 
matters, often spearheaded by public interest legal organiza-
tions, making them accountable to those organizations’ support-
ers.38 The entrepreneurs, on the other hand—the “true  
‘bounty hunter[s],’ motivated by . . . financial recovery . . . ra-
ther than . . . psychic income”—litigate mostly antitrust, securi-
ties, mass tort, and shareholder derivative cases.39 This, Coffee 
argues, places them “beyond the control of the typically large and 
amorphous class of clients . . . [they] represent.”40 Coffee’s anal-
ysis presented a cautionary tale focused on the potential harms 
 
“purely” private actor given the government’s ability to intervene: “Private par-
ties may litigate these cases themselves, or the government may intervene and 
displace the private relator. Either way, the private party may share in the gov-
ernment’s recovery.” Id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. at 295–98. 
 36. This term, coined by Appellate Court Judge Jerome Frank, first ap-
peared in the 1943 case Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 
134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), but did not become popularly used until the 
1970s. See Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 215 n.1 (citing 
Frank’s opinion that “[s]uch persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private 
Attorney Generals”); Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2134–35. 
 37. See Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 235. 
 38. See id. at 235–36. 
 39. Id. at 235. 
 40. Id.  
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of failing to restrain the entrepreneurial private attorney gen-
eral. Yet, it also came with a prediction that financial pressures 
on public interest attorneys and incentives in large class actions 
may lead some ideological attorneys to “migrat[e]” toward entre-
preneurialism.41 
In another foundational work, William Rubenstein divided 
private attorneys general into three camps: those who act as a 
“substitute” for, as a “supplement” for, or as a “simulated” public 
attorney general.42 Rubenstein’s “substitutes” include both 
bounty hunter-style private attorneys and those brought in by a 
public attorney general to litigate on the government’s behalf.43 
His “supplements” include private cases that contribute to the 
greater public interest—for example, environmental “citizen 
suits” in which, by seeking redress for citizens’ own injuries, pri-
vate class action attorneys also advance public policy.44 And Ru-
benstein’s “simulators” are attorneys acting for individual pri-
vate clients whose behavior unintentionally benefits the public, 
through, for example, establishing a fund that benefits many, 
even if brought as an individual case.45  
This Article’s proposal for public-private co-enforcement fo-
cuses on federal statutes that both authorize a government 
agency to litigate violations and give citizens a private right of 
action to sue for their own injuries arising out of the same harms. 
As such, on Clopton’s continuum of all public and private over-
lap, it includes his “hybrid” category of private attorneys general 
and some privately enforced “citizen suits” where clients suffer 
their own injuries.46 But it excludes both privately enforced qui 
tam suits of non-injured parties in place of the government and 
publicly enforced parens patriae suits of state attorneys general 
in place of individuals. It, therefore, focuses on what Coffee iden-
tifies as “ideological” private attorneys general (and not those 
that are “entrepreneurial”),47 and on what Rubenstein identifies 
as “supplemental” private attorneys general (and not those that 
 
 41. See id. at 236. This, he correctly feared, could cause judicial “dissatis-
faction,” resulting in “judicial winnowing of class and derivative actions, as 
courts impose more procedural and evidentiary hurdles on . . . plaintiff[s].” Id. 
 42. See Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2143–46. 
 43. See id. at 2145–46. 
 44. See id. at 2147–49. 
 45. See id.  
 46. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 294. 
 47. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text. 
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are “substitutes” or “simulat[ors]”).48 While other areas of over-
lap may be ripe for coordination, this Article’s proposal of co-en-
forcement litigation is aimed solely at those “hybrid” claims in 
which both private injured citizens and government enforcement 
agencies might choose to litigate the same claims against the 
same actors.  
With this definition in mind, this Section turns now to the 
theoretical foundations for hybrid schemes, focusing on ration-
ales drawn from political and economic theory.  
2. Political Theory Rationales 
The history of the enactment of hybrid federal statutory re-
gimes in U.S. law illustrates the political theory behind a paral-
lel public-private enforcement approach. As Stephen Burbank 
and his co-authors detail, federal statutes that encouraged pri-
vate enforcement developed at several points throughout U.S. 
history, but reach a highpoint in the late twentieth century.49 
Between 1960 and 1980, two-and-a-half times as many such 
statutes passed as had been passed in the nearly one hundred 
years prior.50 Originally coined in a 1943 court decision related 
to the New Deal, the term “private attorney general” did not gain 
prominence until the 1970s when a series of new statutes made 
attorneys’ fees available.51 “Once loosed as a matter of money,” 
William Rubenstein notes, the spread of the private attorney 
general concept “was limited only by the imagination of lawyers 
seeking attorneys’ fees.”52 
Scholars suggest several political rationales behind the rise 
of statutes conferring private rights of action. First, allowing 
both public and private actors to participate in law enforcement 
 
 48. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text; see also Burbank et al., 
supra note 1, at 661 (distinguishing between hybrid regimes that are “comple-
mentary” (which this Article includes) and those that are “substitutionary” 
(which this Article does not include)).  
 49. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 644 (citing four points in history: 
the post-Civil War Reconstruction Era, the Progressive era at the turn of the 
century, the New Deal era after the Great Depression, and the Civil Rights era 
of the 1960s). 
 50. See id. (observing that seventy statutes passed between 1960 and 1979 
as compared with twenty-eight between 1887 and 1959). 
 51. See Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2134–35; see also Coffee, Rescuing the 
Private AG, supra note 6, at 215. 
 52. See Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2136. 
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may help resolve distrust of government. As Burbank et al. sug-
gest, legal systems and enforcement mechanisms reflect the 
preferences of those who create them, including key American 
values like “self-reliance, belief in the virtues of free market cap-
italism, . . . and distrust of government.”53 Drawing on Robert 
Kagan’s work on “adversarial legalism,” Burbank et al., identify 
that political institutional structures—not some internal pro-
pensity toward litigiousness—helped spark hybrid enforcement 
regimes.54 As they describe it, “[p]rivately-initiated litigation 
satisfies the impulse in favor of decentralized regulation,” while 
also reducing costs to the taxpayers who must foot the bill for 
government enforcement.55  
Second, the development of hybrid enforcement schemes re-
flects power struggles between the separate branches of U.S. 
government. As extensively detailed by Sean Farhang and his 
co-authors, fragmented enforcement of federal statutes reflects 
concerns over which branch will maintain control over federal 
law.56 In a political system of divided government, in which pass-
ing legislation is difficult and “the status quo [is] ‘sticky,’” Far-
hang et al. suggest that creating private enforcement instead of, 
or in addition to, federal agency enforcement helps preserve the 
enacting legislators’ preferences should party power in the legis-
lature change.57 It also preserves their preferences against com-
peting preferences from the executive branch, administrative 
bureaucrats, or a politically appointed judiciary.58 Privatizing at 
least some of the cost of new regulation may also help create 
 
 53. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 645. 
 54. See id. at 644–46 (citing ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: 
THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 9, 15–16, 34 (2001)). 
 55. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 645 (drawing on KAGAN, supra note 
54). 
 56. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 6, at 3–4, 31–34; Burbank 
et al., supra note 1, at 643, 646–48, 679, 691, 714; Burbank & Farhang, supra 
note 6, at 1547–50; Sean Farhang, Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in 
the American Separation of Powers System, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 821, 821–24 
(2008); Sean Farhang & Miranda Yaver, Divided Government and the Fragmen-
tation of American Law, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 401 (2016). 
 57. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 6, at 3–4, 31–34; Burbank 
et al., supra note 1, at 643, 646–48, 679, 691, 714; Farhang & Yaver, supra note 
56, at 401–04, 415. 
 58. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 6, at 3–4, 31–34; Burbank 
et al., supra note 1, at 643, 646–48, 679, 691, 714; Farhang & Yaver, supra note 
56, at 401–04, 415. 
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compromise needed to pass legislation in divided representative 
government.59 For example, when enacting Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,60 Burbank et al. suggest the Democratic-con-
trolled Congress “self-conscious[ly] mobiliz[ed] . . . private law-
suits at the expense of administrative power” due to both a “fear 
of bureaucratic drift” and concerns over the cost of purely public 
means of implementation.61  
Third, allowing private individuals to pursue litigation on 
behalf of the public serves democratic ideals by providing a fo-
rum for a range of public interests beyond the agency’s own 
agenda.62 Myriam Gilles notes that, in hybrid schemes, private 
lawsuits “represent a democratic, participatory mechanism that 
affords concerned citizens a means to redress [public harms]” 
and have a voice in government decisions.63 Involving more di-
verse participants in enforcement may also produce a greater 
and more reliable body of information on violations of the law.64 
 
 59. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 679. 
 60. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e to e-17 
(2012), is the main federal statute prohibiting race, sex, and other protected-
class discrimination in employment. 
 61. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 691–94; see also Burbank & Far-
hang, supra note 6, at 1547–50. To overcome Southern Democrats’ opposition to 
the bill, Northern Democrats had to rely on moderate Republicans, who knew 
they had to respond to the Civil Rights crisis, but feared “overzealous” enforce-
ment by the Kennedy/Johnson executive branch. The result: “conservative Re-
publicans stripped the EEOC of the strong administrative powers initially pro-
posed by advocates of the job discrimination title, and provided instead for 
private lawsuits with economic incentives for enforcement, including attorney 
fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs.” Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 692. Ironi-
cally, when government enforcement weakened during the Reagan administra-
tion yet the judiciary sided increasingly with plaintiffs, civil rights advocates 
changed their view to favor private litigation over government enforcement, 
moving to amend the statute with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which “add[ed] 
new monetary damages and jury trial provisions with the express goal of in-
creasing private enforcement.” Id. at 693–94. 
 62. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 662 (“[R]elative to administrative 
implementation, private enforcement regimes can . . . take advantage of private 
information to detect violations [and] . . . facilitate participatory and democratic 
governance.”); Farhang & Yaver, supra note 56, at 402–03; Gilles, Reinventing 
Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1417–30. 
 63. See Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1420–21 
(citing ENVTL. POLICY DIV. OF THE CONG. RESEARCH SERV. OF THE LIBRARY OF 
CONG., 93D CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CON-
TROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 819 (Comm. Print 1973)). 
 64. See Farhang & Yaver, supra note 56, at 402–03 (noting that more par-
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Gilles describes this as a natural extension of the federal govern-
ment seeking citizen help in law enforcement, “on the theory 
that . . . the citizenry[’s] millions of ‘eyes on the ground’ see far 
more than federal investigators ever could.”65 
Yet despite their advantages from the perspective of politi-
cal theory, overlapping enforcement schemes have also been sub-
ject to criticism due to their divided design. Where enforcement 
is split among government and private enforcers, each may look 
to the other creating a collective action problem that results in 
“shirking,” with neither party taking ultimate control or respon-
sibility.66 Because no one is in control, no one is accountable; 
this, in turn, may exacerbate public skepticism of government.67  
Having two separate enforcers with two separate enforce-
ment mechanisms can also lead to confusion, contradiction, and 
even dysfunction.68 As Zachary Clopton has demonstrated, over-
lapping enforcement structures may wreak havoc in terms of le-
gal procedural doctrine.69 Agency and private litigation may oc-
cur simultaneously, with different aims and objectives; court 
 
ticipants can “cultivate the creation and use of valuable information and exper-
tise, productively leverage distinctive forms of institutional capacity, and foster 
the representation of a wider range of groups and interests in the policymaking 
process”); see also Clopton, supra note 6, at 310 (“Redundancy also permits ‘per-
spectival aggregation,’ as agents may offer a diversity of problem-solving ap-
proaches. . . . [P]ublic and private enforcers likely differ in their access to infor-
mation, expertise, and perspectives.”). 
 65. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1429. 
 66. Clopton, supra note 6, at 311–12. 
 67. Farhang & Yaver, supra note 56, at 402, 404 (“Because fragmentation 
weakens control over policymaking by elected officials, it erodes the democratic 
accountability of policy makers.”); see also Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 667 
(stating the argument that private enforcement “lack[s] democratic legitimacy 
and accountability”). 
 68. Farhang & Yaver, supra note 56, at 402 (explaining the argument that 
fragmentation “produces legal uncertainty, indeterminacy, and contradiction”); 
see also Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 667 (describing the arguments that 
“private enforcement regimes . . . produce inconsistent and contradictory doc-
trine from courts [and] weaken the administrative state’s capacity to articulate 
a coherent regulatory scheme”). But see Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, 
supra note 6, at 1424–25 (suggesting that, in the context of police misconduct 
litigation, a private-only enforcement scheme “would . . . tap the experiential 
and financial resources of the citizenry, but in a manner that is [a] highly inef-
ficient . . . patchwork of uncoordinated litigation efforts,” whereas a hybrid 
“deputation model aligns public and private interests in a fashion that encour-
ages coordinated litigation strategies aimed at developing national standards”). 
 69. Clopton, supra note 6, at 328–29 (“Simultaneous suits risk duplicative 
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decisions and interpretations may contradict one another.70 Sim-
ultaneous, separate litigation may create confusion over the pre-
clusive effect of judgments by alternative enforcers.71 This is a 
complex, context-specific problem for each hybrid enforcement 
scheme given that, as Clopton notes, “there is no universal tem-
plate for rules on preclusion, damages, and claims processing 
that modulate public-private enforcement.”72  
Thus, while statutes that create divided enforcement au-
thority reflect American political norms73 and an intentional de-
sign choice to balance power in the face of uncertain control,74 
they bring with them the attendant risks of conflict, confusion, 
and inertia. 
3. Economic Theory Rationales 
A separate, but related group of considerations for hybrid 
enforcement grows out of economic theory. The chief economic 
argument in favor of hybrid enforcement systems is that they 
increase overall enforcement of the law while also shifting the 
cost of the increase away from the public fisc.75 In his germinal 
work on the private attorney general, John Coffee describes this 
advantage, noting that “the role of private litigation is not simply 
to secure compensation for victims, but is at least equally to gen-
erate deterrence . . . by multiplying the total resources commit-
ted to the detection and prosecution of . . . prohibited behavior.”76 
 
work and lose out on beneficial aggregation. [They] also risk shirking, as both 
agents will prefer that the other makes costly investments in research. [And] if 
simultaneous litigation creates a race, it may discourage enforcers from sharing 
information, while encouraging them to cut corners, strike sweetheart deals, or 
engage in inefficient gamesmanship.”); id. at 299–306, 325–26, 328–29 (discuss-
ing further procedural challenges of overlapping regimes). 
 70. See id. at 299–306, 328–29. 
 71. See id. at 299–306, 325–26, 328–29.  
 72. Id. at 292. 
 73. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 645–46 (citing KAGAN, supra note 
54). 
 74. See id. at 647–48, 713–14. As Farhang and Yaver explain, from the per-
spective of the executive branch, administrative structures may have become 
“more and more cumbersome, unwieldy, and hard to manage” because “[t]hey 
were, in part, intended to be so,” designed by “Congresses wishing to check sub-
version of legislative preferences by hostile executives.” Farhang & Yaver, supra 
note 56, at 415. 
 75. See Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 218–25. 
 76. Id. at 218. 
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Enabling private enforcers to litigate was intended as a “neces-
sary supplement” to public agency enforcement:77 as Coffee ex-
plains, the “private attorney general is induced by the profit mo-
tive to seek out cases that otherwise might go undetected.”78 A 
hybrid system that incentivizes private attorneys to pay up front 
for the cost of litigation with the promise of attorneys’ fees or a 
bounty reward provides added enforcement with no cost to cash-
strapped public agencies.79 Indeed, as Gilles suggests, reliance 
on private enforcement to supplement public agency budgets is 
now both assumed and expected.80  
A second economic rationale for hybrid enforcement is that 
it fosters healthy competition that can lead to innovation and 
ensure robust enforcement.81 Public and private enforcers com-
peting for fines or damages may work harder and faster to beat 
each other to the punch in filing, and succeeding in, litigation.82 
The fact that Congress has created a private right of action to 
encourage enforcement of any particular statute also sends a 
message—as Burbank et al. describe it, a “clear and consistent 
signal that violations will be prosecuted,” which “insur[es] 
against the risk that a system of administrative implementation 
will be subverted.”83 Clopton adds that redundant authority to 
 
 77. Id. (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)). 
 78. Id. at 220. 
 79. See COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 219 
(“[P]rivate enforcement of law through entrepreneurial litigation does litigate 
complex cases well (probably better than more resource-constrained public en-
forcers can do).”); Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 662 (noting arguments that 
“private enforcement regimes can . . . multiply resources devoted to prosecuting 
enforcement actions [and] shift the costs of regulation off of governmental budg-
ets and onto the private sector”); Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2149–50 (describ-
ing the view of “private attorneys general [as] a necessary supplement to gov-
ernment enforcement” given that “public attorneys may be fewer in number, 
underfunded, less skilled, or prone to political pressures”).  
 80. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 626 (noting that “[p]ri-
vate involvement in public civil law enforcement is [so] deeply embedded in our 
politics and culture” that many agencies “are funded and organized on the clear, 
if largely unspoken, understanding that a vigorous and well-stocked private bar 
sits ready to deploy its ample resources to redress frauds and other harms per-
petrated upon the general public”). 
 81. See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 662 (“[P]rivate enforcement regimes 
can . . . encourage legal and policy innovation.”); Clopton, supra note 6, at 308–
11; Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2149–50. 
 82. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 308–11.  
 83. Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 662. 
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enforce public law prevents under-enforcement because having 
two parallel enforcers ensures that either will make up for the 
other’s preferences or errors in selecting and prosecuting cases.84  
Yet, as with political rationales, the same economic ration-
ales that support hybrid enforcement also spark criticism. Hy-
bridity compounds total resources spent on enforcement without 
additional public cost, but it may also lead to inefficient duplica-
tion.85 As Clopton describes, a robust literature supports proce-
dural “maximalism” opposed to redundancies across civil proce-
dure, including in the context of public law enforcement.86 
Hybrid enforcement schemes may effectively protect against un-
der-enforcement, but they also risk the opposite consequence of 
over-enforcement and “multiple punishments” against the same 
actors for the same behavior.87 Coffee suggests that economists’ 
concerns that hybrid enforcement leads to broad, “excess deter-
rence” may be overstated.88 But while private lawsuits may not 
“broaden the scope” of enforcement, he notes, they may “inten-
sif[y] the penalty” instead.89 
 
 84. Clopton, supra note 6, at 290, 308–11 (“Redundant public-private au-
thority should mean that fewer good cases are missed . . . . [R]edundant litiga-
tion may cure existing under-enforcement and deter future under-enforcement 
by allowing a second agent to fill the remedial gap . . . .”). 
 85. See id. at 288–90 (describing economic arguments against duplication); 
Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 221 n.15 (describing further 
arguments). 
 86. Clopton, supra note 6, at 288 (“[T]he mere mention of duplication is met 
with resistance across a range of procedural contexts.”); id. at 288–89 (“Modern 
civil procedure evinces a ‘maximalist’ preference against redundancy.”); id. at 
288 n.12 (citing and collecting studies). 
 87. Id. at 290 (describing that, while redundancy prevents under-enforce-
ment, “redundant litigation [also] risks over-enforcement in the form of multiple 
punishments”); see Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 220–21, 
220 n.14. 
 88. Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 220–25 (citing “avail-
able empirical evidence,” which he acknowledges may be imperfect and incom-
plete, that follow-on private securities and antitrust cases filed after public en-
forcement actions did not significantly increase “the probability of detection”); 
see Gilles & Friedman, Exploding the Myth, supra note 6, at 155–59 (raising 
doubts that class-action lawsuits overdeter efficient behavior). 
 89. Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 223; see Rubenstein, 
supra note 6, at 2151 (“The only supplemental function performed by this pri-
vate attorney general is that of multiplying wrongdoers’ penalties: she provides 
no independent search skills, no special litigation savvy, and no nonpoliticized 
incentives. She simply piles on and runs up the tab.”). Coffee acknowledges, 
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Another, and the most robust, economic criticism of hybrid 
enforcement is what Coffee and other law and economics schol-
ars refer to as the “agency costs” caused by the disconnect be-
tween the financial interests of plaintiffs’ attorneys and the pub-
lic interests of the clients they represent.90 Because each plaintiff 
in a large securities, consumer, or antitrust class action will have 
a very small individual recovery, the class members may not be 
interested enough to exert control over the plaintiffs’ attorneys.91 
So unchecked, an opportunistic plaintiffs’ attorney becomes a 
“rent-seeking entrepreneur” who may settle the case in a way 
that meets the attorney’s own financial interest, leaving individ-
ual plaintiffs under-compensated.92 Gilles has challenged the 
“agency costs” theory for its focus on individual class member 
compensation as the goal of private enforcement of public law 
 
however, that there may still be “social utility” in deep, rather than broad, en-
forcement. Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 224–25 (“‘[F]ree 
riding’ by the private plaintiff on governmental enforcement efforts is by no 
means without social utility: . . . it does escalate the penalty structure . . . [and] 
may be more efficient for public agencies to concentrate on detection . . . and 
leave the actual litigation of the case to private enforcers, who are frequently 
more experienced in litigation tactics.”). 
 90. Gilles, Can Coffee Rescue?, supra note 6, at 1002–04 (citing and describ-
ing COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 117, 219); see Cof-
fee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 218–19; Rubenstein, supra note 
6, at 2140, 2161–65 (“Professor Coffee specifically, and law and economics schol-
ars more generally, proposed rules that sought to reduce agency costs by ‘better 
align[ing] the interests of the plaintiff’s attorney’ with those of the class mem-
bers she represented. So convincing was this solution that it became a virtual 
mantra of the class action literature in the 1990s . . . . ”). See generally Samuel 
Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 3165, 3183–85 (2013), for a discussion of agency costs in class actions out-
side of the “securities and corporate governance” context. 
 91. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Bal-
ancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
884 (1987); Gilles, Can Coffee Rescue?, supra note 6, at 1003 (citing COFFEE, 
ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 117, 219) (“[P]rivate enforce-
ment is ‘persistently misdirected’ by ‘fiduciary failure’—the structurally misa-
ligned incentives that lead ‘plaintiff’s attorneys to settle cases in their own in-
terest.’ . . . [A] corresponding detriment is that the named plaintiffs’ interests 
are too small to warrant any substantial investment in monitoring the law-
yers.”); Gilles & Friedman, Exploding the Myth, supra note 6, at 113–16 (de-
scribing scholarly arguments regarding plaintiff incentives their article seeks 
to debunk). 
 92. Gilles & Friedman, Exploding the Myth, supra note 6, at 113–16. 
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rather than whether a class action lawsuit “causes the defend-
ant-wrongdoer to internalize the social costs of its actions.”93 Yet 
she, too, acknowledges the possibility of a problematic disconnect 
between class action attorneys and the class members they rep-
resent, a “tyranny paradox” inherent in litigation as an enforce-
ment mechanism whereby a class action attorney’s settlement 
that benefits some or all class members also precludes the ability 
of others to sue for their own “better or different relief.”94 
Thus, while hybrid systems allowing both public and private 
enforcement offer a way to increase and ensure robust enforce-
ment without adding public costs, they bring with them at-
tendant risks of duplication, excessive penalties, and straying 
from serving public goals through private litigation. 
B. PUBLIC-PRIVATE CO-ENFORCEMENT THEORY 
Having articulated the theoretical foundations for, and crit-
icisms of, hybrid public-private enforcement of federal public 
law, this Section applies them to a proposal of public-private co-
enforcement. What is lost—or gained—when applying the same 
political and economic rationales that support separate, parallel 
enforcement mechanisms instead to public and private enforcers 
litigating collaboratively on the same matters together? This 
Section argues that, while not a panacea, co-enforcement offers 
the promise of both maintaining the theory-based benefits of hy-
brid enforcement and overcoming some of its challenges. It first 
defines this Article’s proposal of “public-private co-enforcement” 
litigation. It then analyzes how integrating currently parallel 
public and private enforcement tracks would impact the political 
and economic theories that supported the development of exist-
ing hybrid systems.  
 
 93. Id. at 104–05 (“[T]he so-called ‘agency cost’ problem is mostly a mirage. 
So far as the vast majority of small-claims class actions go, concerns with the 
undercompensation of absent class members are totally misplaced . . . . All that 
matters is whether the practice causes the defendant-wrongdoer to internalize 
the social costs of its actions. Once this normative polestar is accepted, much of 
the recent literature on [agency costs in] class actions comes up for reexamina-
tion.”). 
 94. Gilles, Can Coffee Rescue?, supra note 6, at 1008. Gilles describes this 
concern as a “‘who the heck are you’ critique aimed at the class action lawyer’s 
self-appointed assumption of power.” Id. In the end, however, she perceives that 
this is not a uniquely private enforcer “interloper” problem, but rather a chal-
lenge of litigation as enforcement as compared to legislation. See id. at 1030–
38. 
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1. Defining “Public-Private Co-Enforcement” 
To apply the theoretical foundations underlying hybrid en-
forcement to a new concept requires first defining the proposed 
concept. A “public-private co-enforcement” scheme as envisioned 
by this Article means both federal agency attorneys and private 
plaintiffs’ attorneys working in collaboration on litigation 
against the same violator for the same harms as, in effect, co-
counsel. Co-enforcement would not usurp the independence of 
either public agency or private attorney enforcers, as nothing 
would require the parties to collaborate, or to refrain from sepa-
rately pursuing an enforcement action, unless they agree to do 
so. The goal would be to develop mechanisms for coordinated lit-
igation, particularly on complex or significant cases against im-
portant actors, for which combined resources could have the 
most deterrent impact on other potential violators. This inte-
grated approach draws on insights from other scholars who have 
studied collaborative enforcement95 and who have raised pro-
posals for improving existing hybrid systems.96 Yet it differs 
from most other proposals in that it does not seek to vest over-
arching enforcement authority in one enforcer or the other, in-
stead arguing for a co-equal approach. 
The term “co-enforcement” was coined by political scientist 
and labor scholar Janice Fine and her colleagues to describe col-
laboration by workers’ organizations and government agencies 
tasked with enforcing labor laws.97 Fine’s work draws on in-
sights from theories of “coproduction” of public services by both 
 
 95. See supra note 6. 
 96. See infra notes 107–19 and accompanying text. 
 97. See, e.g., Matthew Amengual & Janice Fine, Co-Enforcing Labor Stand-
ards: Unique Contributions of State and Worker Organizations in Argentina and 
the United States, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 129, 129 (2017) (defining co-enforce-
ment as the “on-going, coordinated efforts of state regulators and worker organ-
izations to jointly produce labor standards enforcement”); Fine, Enforcing Labor 
Standards, supra note 20, at 361–63 (“Co-enforcement conceptualizes state ca-
pacity for enforcement as a process of negotiated interdependence between reg-
ulators and societal organizations.”); Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strength-
ening Labor Standards Enforcement Through Partnership with Workers’ 
Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 553 (2010) (calling for “workers’ organiza-
tions as well as firms to partner with the government to detect violators”); see 
also Fine, New Approaches, supra note 20, 146 n.13 (explaining that co-enforce-
ment was “developed by Amengual and Fine” and “draws heavily upon Fine & 
Gordon”); Patel & Fisk, supra note 20, at 3–4 (explaining Fine and her collabo-
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state and citizen,98 “collaborative governance” between state 
agencies and stakeholder groups,99 and “republican tripartism” 
to involve public interest groups in regulatory governance.100 
Fine proposes that, by engaging with workers’ centers and key 
nonprofit organizations, government agencies can overcome lim-
ited resources and worker distrust to ensure more effective en-
forcement of health and safety and wage and hour laws.101 She 
conducted several empirical studies of “emerging models of co-
enforcement,” including partnerships between organizations 
that serve vulnerable workers and government agencies respon-
sible for enforcing labor laws in Austin, Los Angeles, and San 
Francisco.102 Among the conclusions Fine drew from her studies 
is that co-enforcement efforts were most successful when the 
agencies and organizations “recognized each other’s unique ca-
pacities” and did not “attempt to substitute for one another,” and 
when “both ced[ed] some control . . . to collaborate.”103 Fine also 
 
rator’s research and documenting an example of co-enforcement in San Fran-
cisco). 
 98. See, e.g., Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 362 (citing 
Elinor Ostrom, Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and Develop-
ment, 24 WORLD DEV. 1073 (1993); Anuradha Joshi & Mick Moore, Institution-
alized Coproduction: Unorthodox Public Service Delivery in Challenging Envi-
ronments, 40 J. DEV. STUD., May 2006, at 32 (2004)); Fine, New Approaches, 
supra note 20, at 147–48 (same). 
 99. See, e.g., Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 363 (citing 
Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice, 
18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 543 (2008)); Fine, New Approaches, supra 
note 20, at 149 (same). 
 100. See, e.g., Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 362 (citing 
Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empower-
ment, 16 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 435 (1991)); Fine, New Approaches, supra note 20, 
at 148–49 (citing IAN AYRES & JOHN BRATHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 54–100 (1992)). 
 101. Fine, New Approaches, supra note 20, at 145–49; see Fine, Enforcing 
Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 361–65. 
 102. Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 362, 367–82 (in-
cluding a co-enforcement partnership with the federal Occupational Health and 
Safety Administration); see also Fine, New Approaches, supra note 20, at 158–
71 (describing further studies including in Palmyra, Pennsylvania).  
 103. Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 362; see also Fine, 
New Approaches, supra note 20, at 149–54. In addition, Fine noted that “[t]rust, 
adaptation, accountability and communication” between co-enforcers were key. 
Id. at 155. 
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noted that political support for collaborative enforcement was es-
sential.104 
Fine’s model for labor standards co-enforcement is unique to 
its own context, and it places workers themselves, not just their 
representatives, in the center of the process.105 Thus it is not di-
rectly applicable to a context focusing solely on attorneys’ ac-
tions.106 Yet Fine’s work provides a helpful analogy—a way to 
conceptualize government and private actors, both of whom seek 
to enforce the same laws, working together. This Article proposes 
a version of “co-enforcement” for public law litigators: a merging 
of enforcement efforts between public agency attorneys and pri-
vate plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking to enforce the same public civil 
laws.  
This Article also builds upon a separate line of scholarship 
that has focused on strengthening existing hybrid enforcement 
by placing greater or overarching authority on the public half of 
the hybrid enforcement scheme. Several scholars have consid-
ered bringing private attorneys under the direction of public 
agencies, either to increase public agency capacity or to curb 
profit-motivated plaintiffs’ attorneys straying from their public 
purpose, or both.107 In an early work, Myriam Gilles proposed 
creating a “public-private partnership” to supplement limited 
public capacity to pursue constitutional claims by “deputizing” 
private citizens to litigate police misconduct cases.108 Gilles pro-
posed authorizing the Attorney General to create an agency re-
lationship between the executive branch and victims of uncon-
stitutional policing in a “classic deputation scheme” that would 
 
 104. Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 363, 367, 379–80; 
see also Fine, New Approaches, supra note 20, at 156–58. 
 105. Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 365–66 (“Agency 
leaders . . . must . . . believe that the full potential for enforcement cannot be 
achieved without including workers . . . and that doing so does not compromise 
their role.”). 
 106. However, public interest law centers, like Bet Tzedek Legal Services, 
played a role in some labor co-enforcement models Fine studied, id. at 373. And 
Fine observed that co-enforcement efforts with the California Department of 
Labor Standards Enforcement increased after the former leader of the Asian 
American Legal Defense Fund, Julie Su, was appointed to head the state 
agency, id. at 374–76; see also Patel & Fisk, supra note 20, at 17–18. 
 107. See Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2163–64. 
 108. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1387–88 (pro-
posing a new private right of action in an area of law that currently lacks a 
hybrid enforcement scheme). 
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vest in the federal government the ultimate “power to quash” 
any related private lawsuit “at any stage.”109 
Others have proposed a greater screening role for public 
agencies or public supervision of “entrepreneurial” private attor-
neys general to reduce the problem of “agency costs” in private 
enforcement.110 David Freeman Engstrom has examined the 
“gatekeeping” role that public agencies play in allowing private 
attorneys to pursue enforcement litigation, suggesting stronger 
oversight with some coordination of private litigation by the pub-
lic agency.111 More expansively, John Coffee has proposed creat-
ing a “semi-private attorney general” in which the public agency 
more directly oversees private class action enforcement, yet 
without absolute veto power.112 This would allow public enforc-
ers to “harness” the “entrepreneurial energy of the plaintiff ’s 
bar” to maximize enforcement capacity, while resolving the 
agency costs problem of profit-motivated private attorneys who 
 
 109. Id. at 1387–88, 1417. 
 110. For arguments in favor of expanded public agency oversight, see, for 
example, COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6; Engstrom, 
Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, supra note 6; Stephenson, supra note 6. Al-
ternatively, Adam Zimmerman and Margaret Lemos have suggested that public 
entities should, in their own enforcement efforts, consider adopting procedural 
protections required of private class action attorneys to better protect and serve 
individual public interests. Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Pub-
lic: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 
(2012) [hereinafter Lemos, Aggregate Litigation] (addressing the lack of proce-
dural rules guiding state attorney general aggregate suits); Adam S. Zimmer-
man, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500 (2011) (suggesting that, when 
compensating victims, agencies should adopt procedures similar to those guid-
ing private class actions); see also Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-
Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853 (2014) (discussing the impact 
of financial incentives on public enforcement litigators); Adam S. Zimmerman 
& Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
1992, 1992 (2012) (proposing that agencies adopt “aggregation procedures” for 
common claims to “promote more efficiency, consistency, and legal access”). 
 111. Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, supra note 6, at 695–712; 
see also David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: 
Empirical Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False 
Claims Act, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1689 (2013) (offering further analysis on how 
the gatekeeper theory works in practice).  
 112. COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 195, 219–35; 
see Gilles, Can Coffee Rescue?, supra note 6, at 1038. 
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are not accountable to any particular client.113 Seeking to “reha-
bilitate” the concept of the private attorney general, Coffee sug-
gests “an alliance under which the ‘gatekeeper’ agency retains 
the private firm . . . on a contingent fee basis” to conduct work 
on behalf—and under the supervision—of the public agency.114 
On the other hand, scholars have suggested that public en-
forcers expand their own role or take on additional enforcement 
tasks to make up for constraints placed on private enforcement 
by over a decade of “litigation reform.”115 In the wake of the Su-
preme Court’s jurisprudence limiting class actions, Gilles and 
Gary Friedman proposed that state governments use their 
parens patriae role to step in on behalf of citizen suits tradition-
ally brought by private plaintiffs’ attorneys.116 States could “rep-
resent the interests of their citizens in the very consumer, anti-
trust, wage-and-hour, and other . . . staple[s] of class action 
practice” no longer readily available to private attorneys due to 
judicial hostility toward class certification and a rise in manda-
tory arbitration.117 Still others have simply called for federal 
agencies to increase their proportion of systemic class-style en-
forcement actions to fill the gaps left by restrictions on private 
class actions.118  
While each of these proposals aims to make use of hybrid 
mechanisms to improve enforcement outcomes, all require the 
public enforcer to take on an increased or supervisorial position 
as principals over private plaintiff ’s attorneys willing to be made 
 
 113. COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 174–75, 195, 
219–35; see also Gilles, Can Coffee Rescue?, supra note 6, at 1038. 
 114. COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 227–28.  
 115. See infra Part II.A.3 (describing “litigation reform” efforts and their im-
pact on private plaintiff’s attorneys’ enforcement lawsuits). 
 116. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 630–31, 668–72. 
 117. Id. Again, the additional work could then be contracted out to those 
private attorneys in a principal-agent relationship, with robust supervision and 
control by AGs over the lawsuits. See id. at 630 (“The active presence of a re-
sponsible elected official here, as both cocounsel and client, vanquishes the 
agency critique in our view. . . . Watchful supervisory control over the litigation 
will be critical.”). 
 118. See, e.g., Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing Out Pattern or Practice After 
Wal-Mart: The EEOC as Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 87 (2013) (calling for greater 
systemic enforcement of Title VII by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission in the wake of precedent limiting class certification); Joseph A. Seiner, 
Weathering Wal-Mart, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343 (2014) (advancing a simi-
lar argument). 
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their agents.119 This Article’s proposal of public-private co-en-
forcement seeks to redress similar concerns of prior scholars, yet 
does so in a novel way that recognizes both the mounting limita-
tions on public agency enforcers and the expertise and independ-
ence of private attorney enforcers. Like Gilles and Friedman’s, 
this proposal seeks to ensure access to the courts for harmed in-
dividuals in the wake of case law limiting class actions and ex-
panding arbitration, and it measures enforcement success in de-
terrent impact.120 And like others, this proposal seeks to harness 
the financial resources of the private bar to bolster increased de-
mand on government agency recourses.121 Yet, while Coffee’s 
proposal focuses on correcting the excesses and problems of “en-
trepreneurial” private attorneys general, this Article’s approach 
focuses on both empowering the “ideological” private attorneys 
general and on protecting government agencies under deregula-
tory attack.122 
 Moreover, prior approaches focus on greater public agency 
control over private attorneys to whom the work is delegated or 
outsourced. Instead, this Article envisions co-equal, co-counsel- 
style collaboration rather than a principal-agent relationship—
an equal partnership between public and private enforcers seek-
ing redress for the same important harms. So constructed, a pub-
lic-private co-enforcement scheme stands to maintain the bene-
fits of a hybrid system, while resolving some of its theory-based 
challenges. 
2. Political Theory Rationales 
Returning to the political theories that supported hybrid en-
forcement design, a co-enforcement model may, in fact, better 
serve the rationales of keeping bureaucracy in check, balancing 
power in divided government, and ensuring democratic partici-
pation.123 If private individuals are distrustful of government 
agencies, having a co-equal private partner may allow a more 
 
 119. See Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 630–31, 668–72. 
 120. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 121. See infra Part II.C. 
 122. See Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 235; infra Part 
II.B.1. 
 123. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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direct watchdog that ensures agency accountability to the pub-
lic.124 If legislators are concerned that executive agencies will 
thwart their political power,125 the legislators’ constituents 
would actively participate in a co-equal co-enforcement scheme. 
And if the underlying goal of a divided enforcement system is to 
make sure that no one party has too much political power,126 a 
co-enforcement partnership requires public and private enforc-
ers to work together, which will necessitate compromise and bal-
ance. 
A collaborative system would also enhance the goal of par-
ticipatory, representative enforcement127 because it would re-
quire agencies to listen to their private enforcement partners’ 
perspectives. Moreover, instead of sharing information on litiga-
tion efforts by “signal” only—where one enforcer infers infor-
mation from the other’s independent actions128—enforcers would 
share and pool information directly, in real time, to enhance col-
lective enforcement efforts.129 
More importantly, a co-enforcement approach may avoid the 
political theory-based criticisms of hybrid systems by improving 
upon parallel, but redundant enforcement. If critics of redundant 
enforcement are concerned about a collective action problem or 
shirking,130 co-enforcement requires internal and automatic ac-
countability. Neither party can shirk without express knowledge 
by the other, who will then be motivated to hold the shirker re-
sponsible.131 
If divided enforcement can lead to contradictory approaches 
or bureaucratic dysfunction,132 for the portion of cases pursued 
through co-enforcement, both enforcers will have to agree on a 
 
 124. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text. 
 126. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text. 
 128. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 312 (citing and discussing literature on 
information “signaling”). 
 129. Cf. id. (“[S]ometimes the relevant data will be complements, e.g., two 
pieces of information gain additional value when put together. In this circum-
stance, the incentive to gather each piece of information is increased rather than 
decreased.”). 
 130. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 131. Cf. Clopton, supra note 6, at 311–12, 311 n.171 (“Shirking also is re-
duced if agents explicitly or implicitly coordinated, dividing the information 
space between them.”). 
 132. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
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unified approach to the case. Any disagreements between co-
equal co-counsel that will, no doubt, arise, will have to be worked 
out and overcome within the context of each case.  
A co-enforcement approach will also resolve any confusion 
about preclusion, multiple punishments, and other procedural 
challenges in parallel redundant litigation.133 Instead of sepa-
rate cases being pursued simultaneously in a race to the court-
house, both public and private enforcers will coordinate in ways 
that clearly establish and account for problems raised by possi-
ble future preclusion.  
3. Economic Theory Rationales 
Likewise, an integrated co-enforcement approach may 
equally serve economic rationales supporting parallel hybrid en-
forcement. If the primary economic benefit of redundant private 
enforcement is that it multiplies total resources on enforcement 
of public laws without requiring additional public funding,134 co-
enforcement should not change that equation. As described in 
Part III, private enforcers will still foot the bill for their own ad-
ditional enforcement and seek reimbursement through contin-
gent and attorneys’ fees.135 On the other hand, if enforcers are 
pursuing the same violators together, this could reduce the 
breadth of coverage provided by supplementing public with pri-
vate resources.136 Even so, that may not be a true loss. As John 
Coffee suggested, private resources do not necessarily produce 
greater breadth in detecting additional violators, but, instead, 
greater depth in “intensity” of penalties.137 Given that, as de-
scribed in Part II, each half of the hybrid enforcement equation 
has less force now than it did two decades ago,138 combining ef-
forts may make better use of existing limited resources. One in-
tense, successful penalty from combined enforcement may be 
equally or more efficient deterrence than broader, shallow, or 
unsuccessful enforcement.  
 
 133. See supra notes 30, 69–72 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra notes 75–84 and accompanying text. 
 135. See infra Part III.B. 
 136. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text; see also Coffee, Rescuing 
the Private AG, supra note 6, at 220–25; Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2140. 
 138. See infra Part II. 
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A co-enforcement approach may also serve the economic goal 
of creating competition to foster innovation in enforcement just 
as well as a hybrid approach.139 While the competition would be 
removed for the portion of cases that are pursued collaboratively, 
the new approach would, itself, be innovative and likely spark 
new policy directions beyond any one piece of litigation. And be-
cause co-enforcement would not replace all parallel, hybrid en-
forcement, competition would still exist for the portion of cases 
each enforcer pursues independently.  
A co-enforcement scheme may, however, be less effective 
than a hybrid “redundant” system’s ability at preventing under-
enforcement.140 At least for the portion of cases pursued collabo-
ratively, enforcers would lose the advantage of each half of a par-
allel hybrid enforcement scheme filling in where the other made 
errors or biased decisions in case selection or approach.141 Yet, 
again, what is lost in breadth of case selection may be counter-
balanced by depth in prosecution—better, more effective, en-
forcement for those cases selected. Collaboration signals to de-
fendant-violators that if their case is selected by a co-
enforcement team, they are more likely to lose. Thus a decrease 
in the probability that any one violator will be targeted may be 
offset by an increase in the probability that, once targeted, a vi-
olator will be more likely to lose against more effective, combined 
enforcement. 
Moreover, a co-enforcement approach may better overcome 
economic arguments against hybridity. Among the strongest eco-
nomic criticisms of hybrid public-private enforcement is that it 
is anti-maximalist, inefficiently duplicative, and may lead to 
over-enforcement.142 For the portion of “redundant” enforcement 
that is made collaborative, these concerns would be entirely re-
solved.143 Rather than duplicating efforts, the two enforcers 
would combine them, resulting in one prosecution and punish-
ment drawing equally on half of each set of resources.  
 
 139. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text; Clopton, supra note 6, 
at 318–24. 
 140. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 308–09 (describing criticism); supra notes 
85–89 and accompanying text. 
 143. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 328–31; supra notes 85–89 and accompa-
nying text. 
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Most importantly, co-enforcement stands to dramatically re-
duce agency costs144 in ways contemplated by previous scholarly 
proposals,145 yet with important additional advantages: main-
taining shared resources and valuing the independent authority 
of private enforcers. Rather than pulling private attorneys gen-
eral entirely under the authority of public enforcers to curb their 
“rent-seeking” instincts,146 a collaborative partnership may 
achieve a similar end while also recognizing the autonomy and 
added value of “ideological” private attorneys general.147 Private 
class action attorneys, many of whom are sophisticated, success-
ful, and effective advocates for private citizens, are not likely to 
jump at the chance to work under the thumb of a public agency 
and its limited resources and heavy bureaucracy. 
While decades of law and economics scholarship has painted 
class action attorneys as clientless opportunists, a more recent 
and emerging literature by scholars including Adam Zimmer-
man and Margaret Lemos148 has questioned the effectiveness of 
public entities in redressing private individuals’ harms after a 
large public enforcement suit. For example, Zimmerman has 
suggested that public agencies should adopt some of the proce-
dural protections of private class actions to ensure fairness to 
the public in large-scale enforcement actions.149 Indeed, as Clop-
ton has documented, there are scholarly arguments critiquing 
private enforcement’s greedy excesses, and there are equally 
strong arguments critiquing public enforcement’s bureaucratic 
ineffectiveness.150  
Rather than making one enforcer the dominant principal 
over the other, a co-equal collaborative design combines the ben-
efits of both halves of the enforcement equation, with each 
providing a check on the other’s limitations, in a manner that 
 
 144. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
 145. See supra notes 107–17 and accompanying text (describing proposals 
by Gilles, Engstrom, Rubenstein, and Coffee). 
 146. See supra notes 10–11, 39–40, 92 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
 148. See generally Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 110; Lemos & 
Minzner, supra note 110; Zimmerman, supra note 110; Zimmerman & Sant’Am-
brogio, supra note 110. 
 149. See Zimmerman, supra note 110, at 556–72; see also Zimmerman & 
Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 110, at 2035–67. 
 150. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 288–89. 
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respects the talents and autonomy of each. So designed, a co-en-
forcement approach stands to serve many of the political and 
economic rationales that sparked hybrid enforcement design, 
while overcoming some of hybrid schemes’ shortcomings.  
C. CHALLENGES FOR THE THEORETICAL BASIS 
The political and economic theories supporting hybrid en-
forcement may support a move to co-enforcement, but a collabo-
rative approach is not without its own challenges. This Section 
considers theory-based counterarguments to public-private co-
enforcement, including that enforcers have differing roles and 
goals, the perception of agency bias, and the risk of removing 
useful redundancy.  
The most immediate challenge to co-enforcement design is 
that public and private enforcers come from two different per-
spectives with differing roles and goals. Scholarship on hybrid 
systems regularly acknowledge that “public and private enforc-
ers possess different preferences and interests.”151 Private plain-
tiffs’ attorneys are presumed to be focused on collecting attor-
neys’ fees or bounty rewards, with a fear of preclusion that may 
encourage settlement at the expense of the public interest.152 
Meanwhile, public agency attorneys are presumed to be focused 
on injunctive relief, motivated by making systemic change.153 
The “conventional story” assumes that enforcers’ primary objec-
tives point in opposite directions of compensation and deter-
rence, with private attorneys looking backward to individual 
damages and public attorneys looking forward to deterring fu-
ture harm.154  
Yet, as William Rubenstein suggests, this is an oversimpli-
fication;155 although public and private enforcers’ interests may 
not be perfectly aligned, there is significant overlap. Privately 
obtained damages (especially if punitive) spark deterrence, and 
publicly obtained fines and fees often compensate past injuries, 
such that, “in reality, both public and private lawyers pursue 
both deterrence and compensation.”156 Where Congress enacted 
 
 151. See id. at 308 nn.149 & 152 (discussing and citing scholarship). 
 152. See id. at 321. 
 153. See id. at 326. 
 154. See Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2140. 
 155. See id. at 2140–42. 
 156. See id. 
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statutes creating both federal agency enforcement and empow-
ering private attorneys general, the intent was to maximize en-
forcement of the same statutory rights.157 So while the motiva-
tions for pursuing actions may be slightly different, the goal of 
the effort to enforce is the same. Co-enforcement teams could fo-
cus on this shared overlap. To the extent the teams would have 
competing goals, they will have to compromise to succeed, which 
may benefit the public by enhancing ultimate penalties and re-
imbursement of enforcement costs. Public enforcers will ensure 
that private enforcers do not settle in ways that “sell out” the 
class; private enforcers will ensure that injunctive relief efforts 
are reimbursed and compensated for through attorneys’ or con-
tingent fees. 
A second counterargument against integrating public and 
private enforcement is the concern that the public enforcers 
could be susceptible to capture by private parties, or could show 
bias toward plaintiffs over defendants.158 In the traditional con-
cept of capture, government regulations or the way in which they 
are applied are “directed away from the public interest and to-
ward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and 
action of the industry itself.”159 For example, a public agency 
might be impacted by the “influence of repeated interaction with 
the regulated industry” or by “campaign contributions, pressure 
on politicians, and . . . the ‘revolving door’” of specialized employ-
ees between industry and agency.160  
Given that the coordination in a co-enforcement litigation 
scheme would include regulators and private attorneys, both of 
whom seek to enforce regulations against industry, traditional 
capture concerns are not implicated. Those regulated may, how-
ever, raise a valid concern about the perception of bias or favor-
itism toward plaintiffs’ attorneys with whom the agency works 
 
 157. See supra notes 1–3, 49–52, 75–80 and accompanying text. 
 158. See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 672–74. 
 159. See Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction to PREVENTING 
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 1, 
13 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014). 
 160. See Carpenter & Moss, supra note 159, at 18–20. A discussion of regu-
latory capture is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the role 
public interest organizations may play in mitigating regulatory capture, see 
AYRES & BRATHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREG-
ULATION DEBATE, supra note 100; Ayres & Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory 
Capture and Empowerment, supra note 100.  
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or who make political contributions that benefit the agency. Yet 
this issue should be less of a concern in a collaborative enforce-
ment scheme than in the deputization schemes others have pro-
posed in which public agencies outsource work to private plain-
tiff ’s attorneys.161 Although federal public agency litigators 
could, technically, be helped by campaign contributions to the 
President who appointed and hired them, this influence is re-
mote.162 As described in Part III in a co-equal collaborative en-
forcement scheme, the plaintiffs’ attorneys would not be con-
tracted or paid by the federal agency; instead they would be 
reimbursed, as usual, from their own attorneys’ or contingency 
fees, for their portion of the co-counseling that occurred. To the 
extent that an agency would be perceived as too pro-plaintiff, 
that perception would likely be no different for any agency that 
litigates to enforce the law against defendant violators, regard-
less of the presence of private co-counsel.163 
A final counterargument to co-enforcement is that it may be 
too maximalist. Efficiency and reducing duplication of efforts 
and multiple punishments may be a laudable goal,164 but, as 
Zachary Clopton argues, fragmented authority and redundant 
 
 161. See supra notes 107–17 and accompanying text. For example, Gilles and 
Friedman raised similar concerns in their proposal that state attorneys general 
hire private attorneys to work on their increased parens patriae suits, citing 
criticisms raised when “state AGs hired well-known plaintiffs’ lawyers to 
sue . . . cigarette manufacturers.” See Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra 
note 6, at 672. Gilles cautioned that “AGs should expect zero tolerance for ‘pay 
to play’ regimes in which campaign contributions are, or appear to be, recipro-
cated by contingent fee engagements.” Id. at 674. 
 162. And certainly far more remote than that of a financial contribution to 
the re-election campaign of the state attorney general litigating alongside pri-
vate attorneys. See supra note 161. 
 163. See, e.g., Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards, supra note 20, at 381 (quot-
ing Julie Su, the head of the California Division of Labor Standards Enforce-
ment, on “government neutrality”: “[W]e are not a neutral agency. We are on 
the side of the law . . . . We need to always act fairly but if you break the law, 
you are going to view our enforcement as biased.”). 
 164. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 288–89 (citing maximalists); supra notes 
85–87, 142–43 and accompanying text. 
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enforcement may be a feature, rather than a bug, of federal stat-
utory design.165 Redundancy helps ensure proper levels of en-
forcement, and courts already have procedural mechanisms for 
resolving problems of overlap.166  
Co-enforcement need not—and likely would not—become 
the norm, however. Enforcers would not get rid of parallel en-
forcement entirely, they would just consider collaboration when-
ever and wherever possible and preferred. This may strike a bal-
ance between duplication that is actually useful and duplication 
that is merely redundant.  
* * * 
As this Part has shown, the same political and economic the-
ories that sparked the development of parallel hybrid enforce-
ment schemes would likely also support a move to public-private 
co-enforcement. Co-enforcement may help resolve distrust of 
government, preserve legislative over solely executive prefer-
ences, ensure democratic participation, and use limited public 
enforcement resources effectively. Moreover, integrated co-en-
forcement can resolve some of the criticisms of parallel hybrid 
enforcement design by reducing contradiction and shirking in 
the enforcement process and duplication and agency costs in lit-
igation. Still, if moving from parallel hybrid to integrated public-
private co-enforcement may make sense as a matter of theory, 
that does not justify changing the status quo. For that, this Ar-
ticle turns to necessity, arguing that current capacity to secure 
enforcement of key public laws is on a path to a dangerous low 
point. 
II.  NORMATIVE CASE FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
CO-ENFORCEMENT   
For over a decade, “litigation reform”167 efforts and related 
Supreme Court jurisprudence have limited class action practice, 
intensified federal pleading standards, and compelled ever-more 
 
 165. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 6, at 3–4, 31–34; Clopton, 
supra note 6, at 290 (explaining that spreading authority “across diverse agents 
may respond to errors, resource constraints, information problems, or agency 
costs at the level of case selection”); supra notes 6, 55, 62 and accompanying 
text. 
 166. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 325–30 (describing helpful mechanisms, 
e.g., “pairing offset with non-preclusion” and using “claims-processing rules,” 
like stays, notice requirements, and timing rules, for intervention). 
 167. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1551–67; infra Part II.A.3. 
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mandatory arbitration—trends that now pose an existential 
challenge to the private enforcement of public law.168 Mean-
while, budgetary constraints and a new level of deregulatory fer-
vor are shrinking already limited public agency capacity for en-
forcement litigation, with reverberations likely felt long into the 
future.169 This Part provides the context in which enforcement of 
public law now lies and argues that, as a normative matter, with 
both halves of the hybrid enforcement system equally hobbled, 
co-enforcement is a necessary response to ensure an appropriate 
level of public law enforcement. It begins by tracing procedural 
trends that now hamper private plaintiffs’ ability to enforce pub-
lic law in the courts, and political trends that now hamper public 
agencies’ own enforcement capacities. It then considers how 
moving to integrated, rather than parallel and separate, enforce-
ment could resolve these constraints. It concludes by considering 
potential normative counterarguments. 
Notably, this Part rests on an underlying assumption that a 
decline in the amount of enforcement litigation pursued is unde-
sirable. If fewer lawsuits are filed and pursued, why is that nec-
essarily a bad outcome? Does it instead reflect increased compli-
ance with the law, or increased alternative dispute resolution? It 
is true that some part of a decline in enforcement litigation may 
be due to these welcome factors; but another, more significant 
part of any such decline is now, or will soon be, due to constraints 
on enforcers’ abilities to pursue litigation.170 This Article pre-
sumes that maintaining a visible level of robust enforcement lit-
igation signals that complying with the law and its regulations 
matters—and that failing to comply comes with serious economic 
risks that outweigh its benefits.171  
A. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT DEFICITS 
For over a decade, legal scholars have been documenting 
how procedural jurisprudence has become increasingly hostile to 
 
 168. See infra Part II.A. 
 169. See infra Part II.B. 
 170. See infra Part II.A. 
 171. This Part also assumes that, to protect the public interest, federal agen-
cies should be actively carrying out their mandates to enforce laws and regula-
tions against those who violate them. If one disagrees with that premise, there 
will be little appeal in co-enforcement’s ultimate goal of more effective enforce-
ment. 
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civil litigation plaintiffs, limiting access to federal courts.172 This 
drift stands to have a profound impact on the ability of private 
litigants to help enforce public laws. Without rehashing the vast 
scholarship on the trend away from private civil litigation, this 
Section seeks to highlight three separate jurisprudential trends 
that have now created a perfect storm of limitations on private 
attorneys general: increasingly mandatory arbitration, intensi-
fied pleading standards, and restrictions on class action certifi-
cation.173  
1. Mandatory Arbitration 
While arbitration has long been a part of business law prac-
tice, the past decade of Supreme Court jurisprudence on manda-
tory arbitration clauses has altered the field, expanding the use 
of arbitration to block litigation in key areas of public law like 
employment, consumer, and antitrust. In a series of decisions 
between 2009 and 2018, the Supreme Court upheld the enforce-
ability of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses, thus fore-
closing litigation, against an increasingly compelling series of le-
gal arguments.174 To do so, the Court majority drew a distinction 
between a statutory right in a federal law and the legal forum—
federal court or private arbitration—in which that statutory 
right may be enforced.175 The majority held so over dissenters’ 
repeated arguments that the distinction between rights and fo-
rum was meaningless for any federal statute primarily enforced 
through a private right of action.176 
The new jurisprudence of arbitration began in 2009, in 14 
Penn Plaza v. Pyett,177 in which the Court effectively overruled 
long-standing precedent to hold that a union’s agreement to ar-
bitrate could waive an individual employee’s choice of judicial 
forum in the employee’s own lawsuit to enforce an individual 
right guaranteed by a federal statute.178 The Court found no le-
gal distinction between individual arbitration agreements and 
 
 172. See infra notes 203–05, 225–27, 248 and accompanying text.  
 173. See also Bornstein, supra note 28, at 123–25, 142–53. 
 174. See id. at 124, 146–51. 
 175. See id. at 146–51. 
 176. See id. 
 177. 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009). 
 178. Id. at 260–68 (effectively overruling Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 
415 U.S. 36 (1974), and holding that individual employees who experienced age 
discrimination could not file a lawsuit in federal court because the union they 
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those signed by a union,179 ignoring Justice Souter’s dissent that 
a private right of action was a “vital element” of federal antidis-
crimination suits, essential to “vindicat[ing] the important con-
gressional policy against discriminatory employment prac-
tices.”180 The next year, in Rent-A-Center v. Jackson,181 the Court 
held that an employee alleging race discrimination was com-
pelled to arbitrate even his challenge to whether the mandatory 
pre-dispute arbitration agreement he signed was enforceable.182 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia laid the foundation for 
the cases that followed, reasoning that any contract with an ar-
bitration clause must be enforced under the Federal Arbitration 
Act of 1925 (FAA) unless invalid as a matter of contract law.183 
This became binding precedent, despite the fact that the FAA 
was intended to allow arbitration among equally-situated busi-
ness entities, not to force citizens seeking to enforce their statu-
tory rights to give up judicial fora.184  
In later cases, the Court held that not only could plaintiffs 
be required to arbitrate federal statutory claims, but they could 
be required to do so on an individual basis—even if that meant 
their claims would not be pursued at all.185 In a 2011 consumer 
 
belonged to had agreed to an arbitration clause in its collective bargaining 
agreement with the employer—despite the fact that the union declined to rep-
resent the employees in their claims).  
 179. Id. at 258. 
 180. Id. at 278 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Bornstein, supra note 28, at 
146–47. 
 181. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010). 
 182. Id. at 65–68, 73–75 (distinguishing a challenge to the fees arrangement 
for the delegation provision from a challenge to the delegation provision itself). 
 183. Id. at 67–68. Because “[t]he FAA reflects the fundamental principle 
that arbitration is a matter of contract,” Scalia wrote, it “places arbitration 
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts . . . and requires courts to 
enforce them according to their terms . . . [unless] invalidated by ‘generally ap-
plicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability’”—none 
of which were alleged in this case. Id. (citation omitted). 
 184. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1642–43 (2018) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting).  
 185. The first case in this series was Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds In-
ternational Corp., in which the Court held that, where the parties disagreed 
over whether the arbitration agreement included class claims, the arbitrator 
exceeded his authority under the FAA by allowing the arbitration to proceed on 
a class-wide basis. 559 U.S. 662, 685–86 (2010). But see Oxford Health Plans 
LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013) (upholding an arbitrator’s decision to allow 
arbitration on a class-wide basis where the parties agreed to submit the ques-
tion, on which the arbitration agreement was silent, to the arbitrator). 
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case, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,186 the Court upheld a man-
datory arbitration clause in an adhesive contract for cell phone 
services that waived customers’ rights to pursue claims on any 
class-wide basis, including in class arbitration.187 Writing for the 
dissent, Justice Breyer argued that, because each consumer’s 
damages amount to roughly $30 in fees, requiring individual ar-
bitration would “have the effect of depriving claimants of their 
claims” (while providing AT&T with a huge windfall in the ag-
gregate).188 
In a 2013 antitrust case American Express v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant,189 the Court compelled individual arbitration, re-
jecting even its own prior precedent on an “effective vindication” 
exception to the FAA when an arbitration agreement “op-
erat[ed] . . . as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue 
statutory remedies.”190 Again, the cost to prove the case ($1 mil-
lion or more in expert fees) dwarfed a plaintiff ’s individual dam-
ages ($39,000 at most); yet the Court found that mandating in-
dividual arbitration “does not constitute the elimination of the 
right to pursue that remedy.”191 In a scathing dissent, Justice 
Kagan called the holding “a betrayal” that would lead to “poorer 
enforcement of federal statutes” and arbitration agreements so 
“pointless” that they are, in effect, “backdoor waivers of statutory 
rights.”192 
Then, in a 2018 employment case, Epic Systems Corp. v. 
Lewis,193 the Court held that the FAA preempts even another 
federal statute that conflicts with an agreement to arbitrate.194 
Employees seeking to enforce their right to fair pay under the 
 
 186. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 187. Id. at 336–48 (holding that the FAA preempted state law that would 
have rendered the contract unconscionable because “nothing in [the FAA] sug-
gests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment of [its] objectives” of enforcing contracts to arbitrate, thus 
preempting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)). 
 188. Id. at 365. 
 189. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
 190. Id. at 242 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)); see also Bornstein, supra note 28, at 
148–49. 
 191. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 234–38. 
 192. Id. at 239–45 (Kagan, J., dissenting). See also Bornstein, supra note 28, 
at 149. 
 193. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 194. Id. at 1623–24. 
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federal Fair Labor Standards Act argued that arbitration agree-
ments requiring them to waive any class-based remedies vio-
lated their right under the National Labor Relations Act “to en-
gage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid 
or protection” at work.195 The Court majority, once again, re-
jected the argument as preempted by the FAA because holding 
“an agreement ‘illegal’ as a matter of federal statutory law” still 
“impermissibly disfavors arbitration.”196 The dissent, by Justice 
Ginsburg, described the majority decision as “egregiously wrong” 
and warned about its impact on the private enforcement of pub-
lic law: 
  The inevitable result of today’s decision will be the underenforce-
ment of federal . . . statutes designed to advance the well-being of vul-
nerable workers . . . The U.S. Department of Labor . . . and state attor-
neys general can uncover and obtain recoveries for some viol- 
ations . . . . Because of their limited resources, however, government 
agencies must rely on private parties to take a lead role in enforcing 
wage and hours laws . . . . If employers can stave off collective employ-
ment litigation aimed at obtaining redress for wage and hours infrac-
tions, the enforcement gap is almost certain to widen.197 
With this suite of cases, the Court has now prioritized the 
FAA’s protection of arbitration clauses over all else—with deep 
implications for private enforcement of federal public laws.198 In-
deed, under long-standing FAA precedent, a plaintiff ’s federal 
statutory rights may be included in an arbitration agreement 
and need not be heard only in federal court.199 But allowing res-
olution of federal statutory claims through private arbitration 
was meant to provide plaintiffs with more choices of forum and 
greater enforcement opportunities.200 The Court has now twisted 
 
 195. Id. at 1624; see 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 196. Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1623–24.  
 197. Id. at 1633, 1646–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 198. See also David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CAL. L. REV. 985, 
985, 1009–30 (2017) (“Arbitration can dramatically alter the returns from en-
forcement of statutes with incentives for private civil litigation.”).  
 199. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) 
(explaining that “statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agree-
ment, enforceable pursuant to the FAA” (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))); Bornstein, supra note 28, 
at 150. 
 200. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29 (noting that “arbitration agree-
ments . . . ‘serve to advance the objective of allowing [plaintiffs] a broader right 
to select the forum for resolving disputes, whether it be judicial or otherwise’” 
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this option into something that can be mandatorily compelled on 
an individual basis, effectively foreclosing enforcement of count-
less claims. Data shows that, in the wake of the Court’s recent 
precedent, employer and business use of arbitration clauses—
including those waiving rights to any class claims—are on the 
rise.201 Worse still, current jurisprudence has emboldened efforts 
to require arbitration in other areas of federal statutory law 
where arbitration clauses did not exist—for example in corporate 
charters or by-laws for public corporations, with the potential to 
cut off shareholder derivative actions to enforce securities 
laws.202  
As legal scholars have noted, the Court’s most recent decade 
of arbitration jurisprudence prioritizing the FAA over all else 
has created a coming crisis in limiting access to the courts.203 As 
a result, the impact on the private enforcement arm of hybrid 
 
(quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 
(1989))); Bornstein, supra note 28, at 150. 
 201. See, e.g., Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“Few employers imposed arbitration agreements on their employees in the 
early 1990’s. After Gilmer and Circuit City, however, employers’ exaction of ar-
bitration clauses in employment contracts grew steadily. . . . [I]n response to 
subsequent decisions addressing class arbitration, employers have increasingly 
included in their arbitration agreements express group-action waivers.” (cita-
tions omitted)); KATE HAMAJI ET AL., ECON. POL’Y INST., UNCHECKED CORPO-
RATE POWER: FORCED ARBITRATION, THE ENFORCEMENT CRISIS, AND HOW 
WORKERS ARE FIGHTING BACK 3 (May 2019), https://www.epi.org/files/ 
uploads/Unchecked-Corporate-Power-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/A27E-6YUP] 
(“By 2024, more than 80 percent of private-sector, nonunion workers will be 
blocked from court by forced arbitration clauses with class- and collective-action 
waivers.”).  
 202. See Hal S. Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Man-
datory Individual Arbitration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1187, 1189 (2013); Alison Frankel, The Case Against Mandatory Share-
holder Arbitration, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-otc-arbitration/the-case-against-mandatory-shareholder-arbitration 
-idUSKCN1L7282 [https://perma.cc/8BWB-6TWN]. 
 203. See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 627–30 (de-
scribing “the game-changing edict that companies . . . may simply opt out of po-
tential liability by incorporating class action waiver language in their standard 
form contracts,” and that “most . . . of the companies that touch consumers’ day-
to-day lives can and will now place themselves beyond the reach of aggregate 
litigation”); Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employ-
ers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 
BROOK. L. REV. 1309 (2015); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704, 720–27 (2012); 
see also Bornstein, supra note 28, at 149–50 (citing scholarship). 
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enforcement systems stands to be extreme. If forced to arbitrate, 
many private citizens will forgo enforcement actions altogether. 
And, if forced to arbitrate individually, many class actions essen-
tial to enforcing public laws will never be brought.204 Even if a 
private enforcer is willing to arbitrate to enforce a federal stat-
ute, the deterrent effect of arbitration is entirely undermined by 
the lack of publication or confidentiality requirements of most 
arbitration resolutions, which remove any signaling effect to 
other potential defendant-violators.205 To the extent that hybrid 
enforcement systems rely on private litigation, compelled arbi-
tration jurisprudence poses a grave threat to the enforcement of 
public law. 
2. Intensified Pleading Standards 
For those private plaintiffs seeking to enforce public law 
who are allowed to litigate rather than compelled to arbitrate, 
another recent procedural development poses a second obstacle: 
intensified federal court pleading standards.206 Around the same 
time as the Supreme Court began its move toward increasingly 
compelled arbitration, it also made a significant procedural move 
toward requiring more from plaintiffs’ initial pleadings to begin 
a lawsuit.  
Since 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were 
enacted, Rule 8(a) had established a broad standard for com-
plaints filed in federal court, referred to as “notice pleading.”207 
As the Court described it in the 1957 case Conley v. Gibson, a 
plaintiff need only provide “a short and plain statement of the 
claim”208 showing that “the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.”209 This 
 
 204. See supra Part II.A (discussing additional constraints on class action 
doctrine). 
 205. See, e.g., Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimina-
tion, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 935–50, 959–60 (2006) (analyzing the shift toward 
confidential settlements of civil rights claims and its consequences). 
 206. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 123–25, 142–46 (discussing pleading 
standards cases). 
 207. See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, 
and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 288–89, 333 (2013). 
 208. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
 209. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiffs must also state “grounds for the court’s 
jurisdiction,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1), and “a demand for the relief sought,” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 8(a)(3). 
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broad standard served the goal of the Federal Rules “to do sub-
stantial justice,”210 the Court explained, and established that a 
complaint should be dismissed only when “it appears beyond 
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim which would entitle him to relief.”211  
In two cases decided in 2007 and 2009, the U.S. Supreme 
Court upped the ante for what a plaintiff must include in a court 
pleading to survive a motion to dismiss, moving from a standard 
of “notice pleading” to a requirement of “plausible pleading.”212 
In 2007, in antitrust case Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,213 the 
Court majority reinterpreted Conley and all of its subsequent 
precedent, reasoning that the “no set of facts” language in Conley 
had been misapplied: it was not meant to create a “minimum 
standard of adequate pleading” but, instead to “describe[] the 
breadth” of possible proof for an “adequate complaint.”214 The 
Court established a new standard for Rule 8(a): a complaint 
pleaded with enough facts to “plausibly suggest[]” rather than 
be “merely consistent with” the plaintiff ’s alleged claims.215 Ap-
plying this standard, the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims that 
telephone and internet service providers had conspired to set 
prices under the federal Sherman Act because their complaint 
failed to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable 
to plausible.”216 As it did in the context of compelled arbitra-
tion,217 the Court’s dissent argued that this changed standard 
would limit private enforcement of public law. Writing for the 
dissent, Justice Stevens explained that Congress’s choice to al-
low for treble damages and attorneys’ fees in the Sherman Act 
showed “inten[t] to encourage . . . private enforcement of the 
 
 210. Conley, 355 U.S. at 48 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f) (2006) (amended 
2007)). Rule 8(f) is now Rule 8(e) and reads: “Pleadings must be construed so as 
to do justice.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e). 
 211. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (emphasis added). 
 212. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 557 (2007). 
 213. 550 U.S. at 562 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45). 
 214. Id. at 562–63. 
 215. Id. at 557–58. 
 216. Id. at 570. 
 217. See supra notes 188, 192, 197 and accompanying text. 
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law,”218 which made it especially important to “not add require-
ments to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically 
set forth by Congress.”219 
Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,220 the Court clarified 
that its holding in Twombly applied beyond antitrust matters to 
all federal pleadings when it dismissed the civil rights claims of 
a Pakistani detainee alleging abuse in federal custody for failing 
to meet the new “plausibility” standard.221 The Court elaborated 
on its Twombly test, describing it as a “context-specific task that 
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 
and common sense”222—a standard that has only contributed to 
further subjectivity and confusion for plaintiffs seeking to file 
federal lawsuits to enforce public law. Justice Souter, who had 
sided with the majority in Twombly, authored the Iqbal dissent, 
in which he criticized the majority for reading the pleadings so 
narrowly as to “den[y] [plaintiff] Iqbal a fair chance to be 
heard . . . .”223 
As with the trend toward compelled arbitration,224 the shift 
to plausible pleading has sparked analysis that goes well beyond 
the scope of this Article—both legal scholarship on its impact on 
plaintiffs’ complaints225 and empirical studies on its effect on 
case dismissal rates.226 Yet while the overall picture may be in-
conclusive, one data point is clear: private lawsuits in which 
 
 218. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 219. Id. (quoting Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 
(1957)). 
 220. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 221. Id. at 678, 684 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading 
standard for ‘all civil actions’ . . . .” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)). 
 222. Id. at 679. 
 223. Id. at 692 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 224. See supra Part II.A.1 (examining this trend). 
 225. See, e.g., SCOTT DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CEN-
TURY: SLAMMING THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOORS? 79–126 (2013) (studying 
this impact); Miller, supra note 207, at 331–39, 346–47 (describing the two cases 
as “a procedural ‘sea change’ in plaintiffs’ ability to survive the pleading stage”); 
A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiq-
bal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1713 (2013) (studying this trend); see 
also Bornstein, supra note 28, at 144–45 (citing scholarship); Burbank & Far-
hang, supra note 6, at 1567–68, 1604–06 (describing same). 
 226. See, e.g., DODSON, supra note 225, at 83–106; Patricia Hatamyar Moore, 
An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 603, 604–07 (2012); Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Meas-
ure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 
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there is information asymmetry between plaintiffs and defend-
ants—such as an employee’s discrimination lawsuit against an 
employer or a consumer’s antitrust lawsuit against a corpora-
tion—are the most likely to be impeded by the intensified plead-
ing standard.227 Thus, for public law statutes in which a private 
right of action is essential to enforcement, like Title VII or the 
Sherman Act, requiring more information at the outset of a case 
prior to discovery poses an additional challenge for those acting 
as private attorneys general.228  
3. Narrowed Class Action Doctrine 
Lastly, should private plaintiffs escape compelled arbitra-
tion and plead plausibly enough to survive a motion to dismiss, 
a third procedural trend may still preclude private enforcement: 
limitations on class action certification.229 While efforts to reign 
in class actions are not new, like arbitration and pleading stand-
ards, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area has cre-
ated additional hurdles.230 
As Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang document, it was 
not long after the increase in federal statutes establishing pri-
vate enforcement in the 1960s that the executive branch shift to 
 
6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011) (examining dismissal rates); Suzette M. Malveaux, 
The Jury (or More Accurately the Judge) Is Still Out for Civil Rights and Em-
ployment Cases Post-Iqbal, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 727–43 (2013); see also 
Bornstein, supra note 28, at 144–45 (citing scholarship). 
 227. See, e.g., DODSON, supra note 225, at 108–12; Patricia W. Hatamyar, 
The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. 
REV. 553, 597, 609, 630 tbl.D (2010); Malveaux, supra note 226, at 721 n.10; 
Moore, supra note 226, at 618–19; Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common 
Sense: A Social Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrim-
ination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 4, 35–38 (2011); Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly 
Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1618–21 
(2011) (examining this impact); see Bornstein, supra note 28, at 144–45 (citing 
scholarship). But see David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Em-
pirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013) (discussing im-
pact of empirical methodology on assessments of Twombly and Iqbal impact). 
 228. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 144–45. 
 229. See id. at 123–25, 151–54. 
 230. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1603–06. For a detailed his-
tory on the rise of the class action device and clashes over its interpretation and 
limitation from the 1950s to the 1990s, see generally David Marcus, The History 
of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 587 (2013) and David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, 
Part II: Litigation and Legitimacy, 1981–1994, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 
(2018). 
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Republican control under President Reagan sparked a desire for 
deregulation and, with it, a project of “litigation reform.”231 The 
Reagan administration recognized that, as private enforcement 
of federal law grew, it posed “an obstacle to their regulatory re-
form agenda.”232 In particular, Burbank and Farhang explain, 
the administration set their sights on statutory fee-shifting pro-
visions that they believed “forced business and government to 
pay the attorneys[ ] . . . of plaintiffs who launched invasive, dis-
ruptive, and costly lawsuits . . . .”233 Throughout the 1980s, the 
administration sought to pass legislation that would cap or do 
away with attorneys’ fees or punitive damages for enforcement 
of federal statutes but, with a few exceptions, were unsuccess-
ful.234  
The Reagan administration did, however, succeed in posi-
tioning deregulation supporters on the Federal Rules Committee 
and in the courts.235 As a result, the “litigation-friendly” Federal 
Rules that had been established in 1938 and amended to support 
private enforcement through fee shifting in class actions in 1966 
were further amended in 1998 and 2003 to the opposite end.236 
As amended, Rule 23 adopted more stringent notice and opt-out 
procedures and modified attorneys’ fees awards, reflecting the 
Committee’s belief that “large attorney fees in the absence of 
meaningful recoveries by class members . . . brings the civil jus-
tice system into disrepute.”237  
Meanwhile, federal courts began to move in the same direc-
tion, with decisions on requirements and burdens for evidence 
 
 231. See Burbank , supra note 6, at 1544–46. 
 232. See id. at 1551–52. 
 233. See id. (“Reagan himself was openly hostile to liberal public interest 
lawyers, characterizing them in the early to mid-1970s as ‘a bunch of ideological 
ambulance chasers doing their own thing at the expense of the . . . poor who 
actually need help’ and as ‘working for left-wing special interest groups at the 
expense of the public.’” (quoting Ronald J. Ostrow, Legal Services Agency Battles 
Reagan Attempt to Cut Off Its Funding, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1981, at B1)). 
 234. See id. at 1552–55, 1562–65 (noting narrow coverage of federal statutes 
in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1996, and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)). 
 235. See id. at 1567–68, 1583–605 (discussing the Advisory Committee). 
 236. See id. at 1583–605. 
 237. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 215 F.R.D. 158, 
183–99, 194 (2003). 
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that made it harder for plaintiffs’ to certify a class.238 This trend 
culminated in 2011, in the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,239 in which, as Burbank and Farhang 
note, it came as “no surprise” that interpretation of requirements 
for class certification “ha[d] been stretched to the breaking 
point.”240 In Wal-Mart, a case in which private plaintiffs alleged 
employment discrimination in violation of federal law, the court 
adopted a new, more stringent interpretation of Rule 23 and re-
versed the appellate court decision granting class certifica-
tion.241 To meet the “commonality” requirement for class certifi-
cation under Rule 23, the Court held it was no longer enough to 
ask whether “there are questions of law or fact common to the 
class;”242 plaintiffs must show that class treatment would “gen-
erate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litiga-
tion.”243 Then, to decide if plaintiffs met this new standard, the 
Court looked beyond certification issues to the underlying merits 
of the case and held they had not. According to the Court major-
ity, the plaintiffs’ evidence lacked “some glue holding the alleged 
reasons for all those [discriminatory] decisions together” and 
failed to prove commonality under Rule 23(a)(2).244 Justice Gins-
burg, writing for the dissent, criticized the Court majority for 
merging Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) and going too far into the mer-
its at the class certification stage, “disqualify[ing] the class at 
the starting gate” of its enforcement action.245  
The Court also held, for the first time, that cases seeking 
more than “incidental” monetary damages accompanying injunc-
tive relief must follow “opt-in” procedures for determining class 
members under Rule 23(b)(3), rather than “opt-out” procedures 
 
 238. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1603–04 (examining this 
trend). 
 239. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 240. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1603–04. 
 241. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 342–43, 346, 367. 
 242. Id. at 349–51 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)). 
 243. Id. at 349 (quoting Richard Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of 
Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)); see Bornstein, supra note 28, 
at 150–52. 
 244. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 344, 349–52, 354–57; see Bornstein, supra note 
28, at 150–52. 
 245. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 368, 377 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see Bornstein, supra note 28, at 150–52. 
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under Rule 23(b)(2),246 likely increasing the cost to plaintiffs’ at-
torneys to pursue class claims and limiting the size of the class 
for those that do.247  
As with arbitration and pleading trends, the literature on 
class action reform is large and robust, a review of which is be-
yond the scope of this Article.248 But, given that class actions are 
an essential tool for private enforcers—especially when an indi-
vidual plaintiff ’s recovery is too small to warrant the cost and 
effort of litigation—the trend toward increasing the costs and 
procedural hurdles for class certification under Rule 23 also 
threatens statutory enforcement.249  
*  *  * 
As the many dissenting Justices in the Court’s recent juris-
prudence on mandatory arbitration, pleading standards, and 
class actions identify, the available forum and the procedural 
rules applied in it may determine whether a federal statutory 
right can ever be enforced by a private attorney general. The 
combined result of these three legal developments has yet to be 
fully felt. Yet, there is no doubt that, together, the trends will 
sharply curb the reach of private enforcement of public law in a 
 
 246. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 359–65, 367–77 (the Court was unanimous on 
this point); see also Bornstein, supra note 28, at 150–52. 
 247. See Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications 
of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 51–52 (2011). 
 248. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a 
More Functional Rule 23, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1098, 1105–14 (2013) 
(detailing “a long line of restrictive federal court decisions that extends back 
almost fifteen years and . . . greatly limited access to the class action device”); 
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1606–08; Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline 
of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013). An entire body of work focuses 
on the Wal-Mart decision’s negative impact on private enforcement of civil 
rights. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 123–25, 151–54; Malveaux, supra note 
247, at 51–52; Seiner, supra note 118, at 1350–51; Michael Selmi, Theorizing 
Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 500–01 (2011). But see Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren 
Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases Challenging Subjective 
Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 433, 435 (2012) (suggest-
ing a more limited impact).  
 249. Procedural limits on class certification are further compounded by the 
separate trend of upholding mandatory arbitration agreements that include 
waivers of any class claims, as described previously. See supra notes 193–201 
and accompanying text. 
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hybrid system—in effect, undermining Congress’s direction for 
how its statutes should be enforced.250  
B. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT DEFICITS 
Turning to the other half of hybrid enforcement mecha-
nisms, public enforcement efforts also now face unprecedented 
challenges and limitations. Of course, federal agencies have al-
ways operated with limited resources determined by federal gov-
ernment budgets. Even scholars critical of rent-seeking private 
class action attorneys acknowledge that a major advantage of al-
lowing private enforcement is its ability to multiply overall en-
forcement resources.251 Likewise, scholars who argue in favor of 
predominantly public enforcement regimes or who propose 
stronger public oversight of private attorneys general recognize 
that, to do so, requires leveraging the finances of the private 
bar.252 Without repeating these concerns, this Section adds con-
temporary context, highlighting that a new level of economic and 
political pressure toward deregulation, exacerbated by recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, now stands to limit public agency 
enforcement into the future.253  
 
 250. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1605–06 (“[T]he Supreme 
Court—whose members are . . . insulated from individual if not institutional 
reprisal—can bring about momentous civil litigation reform that would be im-
possible to secure from the legislature or its delegated procedural lawmaking 
bodies . . . . [Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Iqbal] involved ‘interpretations’ that are 
inimical to private enforcement . . . .”); supra notes 167–71 and accompanying 
text. 
 251. See, e.g., COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 18–
30; Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 218–25 (discussing this 
advantage). 
 252. See, e.g., Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1384 
(explaining finances); Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 623. 
 253. See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger & Paul Kiel, After Budget Cuts, the IRS’ Work 
Against Tax Cheats Is Facing “Collapse,” PROPUBLICA (Oct. 1, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/after-budget-cuts-the-irs-work-against-tax 
-cheats-is-facing-collapse [https://perma.cc/L8ES-VGBP]. But see Jonathan 
Remy Nash et al., The Production Function of the Regulatory State: How Much 
Do Agency Budgets Matter?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 695, 734–41 (2017) (describing 
the complex, non-linear relationship between agencies’ budgets and their effec-
tiveness). 
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1. Executive Preferences and Budget Constraints 
Discretionary budgets and federal agency spending have 
risen and fallen over time, usually in line with changes in exec-
utive branch preferences between Republican and Democratic 
administrations. Since the rise of federal statutes with hybrid 
regimes in the 1960s,254 most Republican presidential admin-
istrations have expressed preferences for smaller government 
and, with it, smaller discretionary agency budgets than have 
most Democratic administrations.255 In over five decades since 
the creation of many federal agencies, this has led to ebbs and 
flows in support for agencies’ enforcement efforts, within a rea-
sonable range of variation.256  
In the most recent decade, however, economic and political 
trends have triggered a notable change in the usual federal 
budgeting process,257 representing a serious threat to reliable 
levels of public agency enforcement. First, the Great Recession 
 
 254. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 6, at 3–4, 31–34; Burbank 
et al., supra note 1, at 644. 
 255. Note, however, that a preference for apportioning less of the federal 
budget to federal agencies has not necessarily translated into less government 
spending overall, due to some Republican presidents’ choices to increase defense 
spending, institute tax cuts, or take other government-funded fiscal measures 
to stimulate the economy. See, e.g., Kimberly Amadeo, Republican Presidents’ 
Impact on the Economy, THE BALANCE, (June 25, 2019), https://www 
.thebalance.com/republican-presidents-economic-impact-4129133 [https:// 
perma.cc/NZY4-HKHK]; Gabriel Florit, et al., 40 Years of Budgets Show Shift-
ing National Priorities, WASH. POST (March 17, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/budget-hitory/?utm_term= 
.54b46b1269be [https://perma.cc/5VZC-ELRN]. 
 256. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, TABLE 
4.1–OUTLAYS BY AGENCY: 1962–2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/2019/03/hist04z1-fy2020.xlsx [https://perma.cc/V6SV-43SX]; OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, TABLE 4.2—PERCENTAGE 
DISTRIBUTION OF OUTLAYS BY AGENCY: 1962–2024, https://www.whitehouse 
.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/hist04z2-fy2020.xlsx [https://perma.cc/SF3G 
-3SKP] (showing proportion of discretionary budget assigned to federal agencies 
relative to defense and other major categories of spending over time). For anal-
ysis of “the budget as a method through which the White House can control 
agencies’ policymaking,” see generally Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget 
as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182, 2187 (2016). 
 257. Since the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 
the usual federal budgeting process is that Congress must draft and authorize 
the federal government’s budget annually in conjunction with the President. 
Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–688 
(2012)). 
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of 2008 required significant investment by the Obama admin-
istration to spur economic recovery, affecting immediate federal 
budgeting priorities.258 Second, partly in response to government 
intervention in the economic crisis, in 2009 a new political move-
ment known as the Tea Party took root, arguing for drastically 
reduced federal government which it viewed as impeding free 
market principles.259 Political success by the Tea Party in the 
mid-term elections of 2010 led to a new era of contentious budget 
fights. During this period, a Republican-led Congress enacted 
the Budget Control Act of 2011,260 which placed limits on discre-
tionary spending and set triggers for budget “sequestration” 
through at least the year 2021.261 
Then, in 2013, disputes over the federal budget and funding 
for the Affordable Care Act led the entire federal government to 
be shut down for sixteen days, for the first time in nearly two 
decades.262  
The political support for smaller government was further re-
flected in the election of populist Republican President Donald 
 
 258. Brian Knowlton, Obama Presses for Action on the Economy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 8, 2009), https://nytimes.com/2009/01/09/us/politics/09obamacnd.html? 
SeachResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/N727-TB2H]. 
 259. Michael Ray, Tea Party Movement, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Tea-Party-movement [https://perma.cc/ 
5DDP-UW9A]. 
 260. Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901 
(2012)). 
 261. Later amended to increase sequestration caps and extend mandatory 
spending cuts through 2023 by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. 
L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013) and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, 
Pub. L. No. 113-67, 127 Stat. 1165. 
 262. There have long been disputes over the federal budget between presi-
dents and Congress when they represent different political parties, but recent 
trends reflect greater gridlock. It was not until 1980 that budget disputes re-
sulted in shutting down the federal government and, between 1980 and 1995, 
budget disputes resulted in federal government closures for a cumulative total 
of seventeen days. See Mihir Zaveri et al., The Government Shutdown Was the 
Longest Ever. Here’s the History., N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2019/01/09/us/politics/longest-government-shutdown.html [https:// 
perma.cc/UB7C-BDMB] (last updated Jan. 25, 2019). Since 1995, however, gov-
ernment shut downs have become a more frequently used political tool, result-
ing in five different shut downs lasting a cumulative period of seventy-nine 
days. See id. 
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Trump in 2016.263 As of the time of publication of this Article, 
the current Trump administration has been among the most rig-
orous and aggressive in enacting its deregulatory agenda. In his 
first year in office, President Trump planned to slash some fed-
eral agency budgets by up to thirty percent,264 and proposed a 
forty-two percent cut in non-defense discretionary funding in 
2019 (including a thirty-four percent cut to the EPA and a 
twenty-one percent cut to the Department of Labor).265 Trump 
also selected cabinet members to lead federal agencies that re-
flected his deregulatory preferences, several of whom were ac-
tively hostile to their agencies’ own missions.266 Under the cur-
rent Trump administration, the clear priority is to undo past 
regulations and strip away public regulatory enforcement in all 
areas of law.267  
If the damage to federal agency enforcement efforts were 
simply a matter of executive branch preferences, however, those 
 
 263. See, e.g., Will Weissert, Smaller Government? Some Trump Supporters 
Cheer the Shutdown, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.apnews 
.com/35303676b04144ffbd3e463d3addb2ba [https://perma.cc/C4W7-Q2HF]. 
 264. Lisa Rein & Andrew Ba Tran, How the Trump Era Is Changing the Fed-
eral Bureaucracy, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/politics/how-the-trump-era-is-changing-the-federal-bureaucracy/2017/12/ 
30/8d5149c6-daa7-11e7-b859-fb0995360725_story.html [https://perma.cc/S6GU 
-22RF]; see also Julia Manchester, Most Key Federal Agencies Have Cut Staff 
Under Trump: Report, THE HILL (Dec. 31, 2017), https://thehill.com/homenews/ 
administration/366925-most-key-federal-agencies-have-cut-staff-under-trump 
-report [https://perma.cc/4UQ3-3YJ7]. 
 265. Dylan Matthews, Trump’s 2019 Budget: What He Cuts, How Much He 
Cuts, and Why It Matters, VOX (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and 
-politics/2018/2/12/16996832/trump-budget-2019-release-explained  
[https://perma.cc/8M8Q-2ZUA].  
 266. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Pruitt’s Successor Wants Rollbacks, Too. And 
He Wants Them to Stick, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/07/27/climate/andrew-wheeler-epa.html [https://perma.cc/BZ83-K6DQ]; 
Hallie Jackson & Kristen Welker, Trump Picks Energy Department Opponent 
Rick Perry for Energy Secretary: Sources, NBC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2016), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-picks-energy-department 
-opponent-rick-perry-energy-secretary-sources-n695241 [https://perma.cc/ 
DLZ9-NHW2]; Pruitt Publicly Admits He Wanted to Get Rid of the EPA, NAT. 
RES. DEF. COUNCIL (July 17, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/trump-watch/pruitt 
-admits-he-wants-get-rid-epa [https://perma.cc/52E9-JYW2]. 
 267. See Nolan D. McCaskill & Matthew Nussbaum, Trump Signs Executive 
Order Requiring that for Every One New Regulation, Two Must Be Revoked, PO-
LITICO (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-signs 
-executive-order-requiring-that-for-every-one-new-regulation-two-must-be 
-revoked-234365 [https://perma.cc/Z2Z4-YK52].  
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could change with a new presidential administration. Yet with 
widespread political and legislative support for smaller govern-
ment, President Trump was also able to pass significant tax cut 
legislation that stands to raise the deficit and dramatically re-
duce discretionary spending budgets for future administrations, 
too.268  
2. A New Era in Campaign Finance 
Beyond general economic and political pressures toward 
limiting federal government budgets, a more seismic shift to-
ward deregulation threatens any future rebound in public en-
forcement levels: recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence re-
shaping campaign financing. In two major decisions in the past 
decade, the Court put its thumb on the scale of political contri-
butions in ways likely to exert intense political pressure away 
from public regulatory enforcement in perpetuity.269  
First, in the 2010 case Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,270 the Court struck down certain restrictions on 
campaign expenditures, holding that they violated free speech 
provisions guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.271 The decision 
allows corporations, labor unions, and others to make unlimited 
political contributions so long as they are not directly linked to a 
specific party or candidate.272 As a result, one political reporter 
described, a “deluge of cash poured into . . . political action com-
mittees” (or PACs), much of it “‘dark money’ [that] never has to 
be publicly disclosed.”273 
While Citizens United removed limits on spending on both 
those who favor a robust regulatory environment (for example, 
 
 268. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054; Jim 
Tankersley, How the Trump Tax Cut Is Helping to Push the Federal Deficit to 
$1 Trillion, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/ 
business/trump-corporate-tax-cut-deficit.html [https://perma.cc/H7UW 
-NC8W]. 
 269. Or until legislation changes this balance—a proposition made all the 
more unlikely by the reality that those who would legislate must fundraise to 
win election to their legislative seats. 
 270. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 271. Id. at 335–66. 
 272. See id.; Gabrielle Levy, How Citizens United Has Changed Politics in 5 
Years, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.usnews.com/ 
news/articles/2015/01/21/5-years-later-citizens-united-has-remade-us-politics 
[https://perma.cc/RZ77-AWSM]. 
 273. Levy, supra note 272. 
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labor unions) and those who oppose it (for example, corpora-
tions), in reality, the playing field is not level. With union mem-
bership at an all-time low of, in 2018, just 10.5% of all U.S. work-
ers and only 6.4% of private sector workers,274 union dues are no 
match for the combined contributions of business interests and 
high-wealth individuals to PACs.275 Over half of the states have 
so-called “right-to-work” laws that allow workers protected by a 
union to opt out of all union dues, including both any portion of 
dues that go to political spending and any non-political “agency 
fees” meant to cover the cost of collective bargaining with the 
employer.276 
More importantly, in a second recent decision, the 2018 case 
Janus v. AFSCME,277 the Supreme Court upheld a “right-to-
work”-style exemption for all public sector employees,278 who 
compose nearly half of all union members in the United 
States.279 The Court held that all public sector employees—who 
already had the ability to opt-out of their unions’ political contri-
butions280—could opt out of their union agency fees, too, reason-
ing that to rule otherwise would “compel[ employees] to subsi-
dize private speech on matters of substantial public concern” in 
 
 274. Tal Axelrod, Union Membership Falls to Historic Low, THE HILL (Jan. 
18, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/news/426026-union-membership-falls 
-to-historic-low/ [https://perma.cc/SST8-FW5L]; Press Release, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Union Members Summary, (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/news 
.release/union2.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/3LYT-F6T2]. 
 275. See, e.g., Curtlyn Kramer, Vital Stats: The Widening Gap Between Cor-
porate and Labor PAC Spending, BROOKINGS (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www 
.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/03/31/vital-stats-corporate-and-labor-pac 
-spending/ [https://perma.cc/QRC3-JU3F].  
 276. Right to Work Frequently-Asked Questions, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LE-
GAL DEF. FOUND., https://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-frequently-asked 
-questions/ [https://perma.cc/R3JH-H92G]. 
 277. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 278. Id. at 2486. 
 279. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 274 (stating that 7.2 million of 
14.7 million unionized workers work in the public sector). 
 280. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
the Court’s prior precedent in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 
(1977), already held that “a government entity could require public employees 
to pay a fair share of the cost that a union incurs when negotiating on their 
behalf over terms of employment[, b]ut [that] no part of that fair-share payment 
could go to any of the union’s political or ideological activities”). 
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violation of the First Amendment.281 Whether public sector em-
ployees will now opt out of union dues en masse remains to be 
seen; but data from right-to-work states indicates that a signifi-
cant decline is possible.282 
This jurisprudence stands to dramatically shift the future of 
political contributions away from legislators and executive 
branch officials who would favor active public enforcement liti-
gation against public law violators283—a new political reality 
that changes the public agency side of the hybrid enforcement 
equation. Believing that the federal government will maintain 
or increase its current level of regulatory enforcement—or could 
increase capacity to allow for greater public oversight over pri-
vate class action attorney enforcers—may now be unrealistic.  
 
 281. See id. at 2460–86 (majority opinion); Dylan Matthews, 6 Excerpts that 
Explain the Supreme Court’s Big Anti-Union Ruling: Janus v. AFSCME Is a 
Very, Very Big Deal, VOX (June 27, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/27/ 
17509460/supreme-court-janus-afscme-public-sector-union-alito-kagan-dissent 
[https://perma.cc/J2Y8-WVXZ]. 
 282. Frank Manzo, IV & Robert Bruno, After Janus: The Impending Effects 
on Public Sector Workers from a Decision Against Fair Share, ILL. ECON. POLICY 
INST. (May 8, 2019), https://illinoisepi.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/ilepi-pmcr 
-after-janus-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7CT-J78A]. 
 283. This trend stands to affect even Democrats who wish to win legislative 
seats at the federal level, at least as it relates to regulation in industry sectors 
more likely to fund Democrats, like financial services and the technology indus-
try. See, e.g., Alan Zibel, Plutocrat Politics: How Financial Sector Wealth Fuels 
Political Ad Spending, PUB. CITIZEN (May 15, 2019), https://www.citizen.org/ 
article/plutocrat-politics-how-financial-sector-wealth-fuels-political-ad 
-spending/ [https://perma.cc/TCL3-4LF8]. Certainly, the success of progressive, 
grassroots-funded candidates like U.S. Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cor-
tez and U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders call this prediction into question. See, e.g., 
Christopher Ingraham, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Received 62 Percent of Her 
Funding from Small-Dollar Donors. The Average House Member Received Less 
than 8 Percent, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/business/2018/12/21/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-received-percent-her 
-funding-small-dollar-donors-average-house-member-received-less-than 
-percent/ [https://perma.cc/SL8D-3HG7]; Holly Otterbein & Maggie Severns, 
Bernie’s New Approach to Raising Cash: ‘Grassroots Fundraisers,’ POLITICO 
(May 22, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/22/bernie 
-sanders-money-1337897 [https://perma.cc/X6TG-EULX]. But a federal budget 
that sets funding levels for federal agencies must be passed by an entire Con-
gress of legislators, all of whom need campaign contributions to maintain their 
seats. 
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C. COLLABORATIVE SOLUTIONS TO ENFORCEMENT DEFICITS 
Both public and private halves of current hybrid enforce-
ment schemes now face critical levels of constraint. On the one 
hand, federal agencies created by Congress to enforce public law 
statutes are hamstrung by slashed budgets and intense deregu-
latory political preferences, limiting their capacity to litigate en-
forcement actions.284 On the other, private attorneys general are 
limited by jurisprudence on compelled arbitration, pleading 
standards, and class action certification, reducing their incen-
tives to take on risky litigation that serves a public good and, if 
a mandatory individual arbitration clause applies, barring them 
from doing so entirely.285 Given this new normative reality, this 
Section argues that a proposal of co-equal co-enforcement has 
much to offer, providing needed resources to public enforcers 
while helping private enforcers overcome procedural hurdles. 
On the public enforcement side, collaboration offers the ob-
vious advantage of providing desperately needed litigation fi-
nancing to public agencies with limited budgets.286 Private attor-
neys general fund their cases through attorneys’ fees, 
contingency fees, and private litigation financing mechanisms, 
all guided by their estimate of the value of the case rather than 
a narrow federal budget.287 Combining forces also provides pub-
lic agencies with additional person-power, and at a high level of 
expertise when those private attorneys are experienced in liti-
gating complex class actions.288 These observations are not new: 
legal scholars have long identified similar advantages of the pri-
vate bar—even those scholars ambivalent about or seeking to 
reign in entrepreneurial private attorneys general.289 Yet co-en-
forcement arrangements offer an important advantage over oth-
ers’ proposals to expand public oversight of private attorneys 
 
 284. See supra Part II.B. 
 285. See supra Part II.A. 
 286. See supra Part II.B. 
 287. See, e.g., Financial Management in a Contingent Fee Practice, 
FINDLAW, https://practice.findlaw.com/financing-a-law-firm/financial 
-management-in-a-contingent-fee-practice.html [https://perma.cc/WJ46-P55Q]. 
 288. See, e.g., Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 225; Ru-
benstein, supra note 6, at 2149–50. 
 289. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 6, at 314–15 (describing how “public and 
private enforcers draw on different resource pools” and “existing redundant-au-
thority regimes are often justified on this basis”); Coffee, Rescuing the Private 
AG, supra note 6, at 225; Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2149–50. 
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general.290 A collaborative co-counsel approach recognizes that 
private attorneys, many of whom have deep expertise and lucra-
tive class action practices, may bristle at the idea of serving as 
contract attorney “agents” for public agencies that they may per-
ceive as overly bureaucratic—and for whom they are footing the 
bill. Indeed, despite three decades of academic calls for federal 
public oversight over private class action attorneys291—and even 
in the wake of new procedural restrictions on private attor-
neys292—there is little evidence that deputization schemes have 
been widely adopted at the federal level.293 As described in Part 
III, each enforcer in a co-enforcement scheme would be co-equal 
in authority and would share in the financing of its own ef-
forts,294 likely a more attractive option for the private bar.  
On the private enforcement side, collaboration offers the ad-
vantage of helping private plaintiffs’ attorneys overcome each of 
the three areas of procedural litigation reform calcified in Su-
preme Court jurisprudence in the past decade.295 For areas of 
public law affected by mandatory arbitration agreements, in-
cluding employment, consumer, and antitrust claims, private at-
torneys may no longer be able to litigate at all without joining 
 
 290. See, e.g., Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 263; Gilles & 
Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 630–31 (“[B]y leveraging the private bar, 
the state AGs [bringing parens patriae suits] can recoup vast amounts of money 
for their citizens and reap commensurate political credit.”); Rubenstein, supra 
note 6, at 2163–64. 
 291. See, e.g., Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6, at 263. 
 292. See supra Part II.A. 
 293. In contrast, outsourcing work to private plaintiff ’s attorneys is more 
common at the state level. See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Lawyers Create Big Paydays by 
Coaxing Attorneys General to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/us/politics/lawyers-create-big-paydays-by-coaxing 
-attorneys-general-to-sue-.html [https://perma.cc/B3FB-SX64] (documenting 
that at least nine states’ Attorneys General have hired private plaintiff ’s attor-
neys to litigate some parens patriae lawsuits on behalf of citizens). In addition, 
private plaintiffs’ attorneys have teamed up with each other to respond to their 
procedural challenges—for example, to file coordinated arbitrations en masse 
in the face of class action litigation waivers. See, e.g., Jon Steingart, Class Ac-
tions Waived? Workers File Hundreds of Solo Arbitrations, BLOOMBERG: DAILY 
LAB. REP. BLOG (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/ 
X5FLC604000000?bna_news_filter=daily-labor-report&jcsearch=BNA%252 
00000015f6ebcd98ea15f7ebe4f3e0000#jcite [https://perma.cc/L5S9-KVKK]. 
 294. See infra Part III.B. 
 295. See supra Part II.A. 
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forces with a public agency that is not bound by individual pri-
vate agreements to arbitrate.296 Likewise, the upfront costs and 
risk involved in modern class certification procedures may pose 
too difficult a hurdle for many plaintiffs’ attorneys to overcome. 
As described in Part III, this challenge may be overcome by co-
counseling with a public agency not required to comply with Rule 
23 to bring systemic cases.297 And, while pleading requirements 
under Rule 8, as recently interpreted in Twombly and Iqbal, 
would apply equally to complaints filed by public and private at-
torneys, private attorneys may benefit from the substantial in-
vestigatory resources and pre-discovery subpoena power of pub-
lic agencies, whose access to information at an earlier phase in 
the case may help ensure surviving a motion to dismiss.298  
After decades of litigation reform efforts to address fears 
about profit-motivations in the private attorney general 
model,299 there are new concerns that the pendulum has swung 
too far in the opposite direction, limiting access to the courts for 
federal statutory claims that rely on private enforcement.300 In 
an era of strong and well-funded public agencies, such concerns 
might have been assuaged by a sense that public enforcers could 
pick up the slack, stepping in where private enforcers are now 
constrained.301 That, however, is not today’s reality. Strong de-
regulatory preferences, exacerbated by corporate campaign fi-
nancing, in the wake of years of litigation reform stand to wreak 
havoc on public law enforcement. As scholars have documented, 
 
 296. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 123–25, 146–67; Gilles & Friedman, 
After Class, supra note 6, at 630–31, 660, 669; infra Part III.A. 
 297. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 123–25, 146–67; infra Part III.A. Gilles 
and Friedman identified similar advantages in their proposal for increased 
state parens patriae cases in consumer, employment, and other areas likely to 
lose private court access due to recent jurisprudence on arbitration and class 
actions. See Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 660 (“[P]arens pa-
triae suits are not subject to Rule 23 or contractual waiver provisions, and so 
avoid the majority of impediments to contemporary class actions.”). Again, and 
beyond the context of parens patriae suits, a co-enforcement approach is unique 
in that federal enforcement agencies and private attorneys general would col-
laborate as equal partners, not as principal and agent, making the private bar 
likely more willing to provide its resources to gain the public agencies’ proce-
dural advantages. See infra Part III. 
 298. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 123–25, 146–67; infra Part III.A.  
 299. See supra notes 10–11, 39–40, 23, 92, 107 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text. 
 301. Indeed, scholars have called for this. See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, After 
Class, supra note 6, at 630–31; Seiner, supra note 118, at 1352–53. 
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public laws enacted by Congress with hybrid enforcement mech-
anisms rely on the robust participation of private enforcers,302 
and public agency budgets are designed with the expectation 
that the private bar will fill an enforcement gap.303 Each side of 
a hybrid enforcement scheme is now operating with one hand 
tied behind its back. From a normative perspective, public-pri-
vate co-enforcement offers the chance to combine the two re-
maining hands to ensure one strong, united enforcement pres-
ence. 
D. CHALLENGES FOR THE NORMATIVE CASE 
Given current constraints on both halves of hybrid enforce-
ment mechanisms, the normative value of co-enforcement 
should be apparent to those who value enforcement of federal 
statutory law. Yet while it offers solutions to existing enforce-
ment challenges, a proposal for co-equal collaborative enforce-
ment must also function in the real world, and has some norma-
tive counterarguments.  
As raised previously, one major challenge from a theoretical 
perspective is that public and private enforcers have different, 
sometimes seemingly conflicting goals.304 The normative coun-
terpart to this theoretical challenge is that public and private 
enforcers may have different, sometimes seemingly conflicting 
cultures, too.305 Public enforcers may necessarily have to operate 
more slowly, with more hierarchy, bureaucracy, and thrift than 
private enforcers would like. Private enforcers may, also out of 
necessity, move more quickly, with less structure and more im-
provisation than public enforcers would like. Both actors may 
also have assumptions or perceptions about reputational harm 
from associating with the other—for example, perceptions that 
private class action attorneys are out for themselves, that public 
agencies are inefficient, or that courts prefer one or the other. 
There is no easy answer to this challenge except that, as de-
scribed in Part III, through communication, building upon 
known relationships, and trial and error, enforcement cultures 
 
 302. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra note 75–80 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text. 
 305. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 171–72; Clopton, supra note 6, at 308; 
Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2137–42. 
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can blend and co-exist.306 The significant upside to working 
through such cultural challenges is that each enforcer offers 
strengths that helps shore up the other’s weaknesses, providing 
the chance to reach a happy medium on structure, speed, thrift, 
and reputational perception.  
A more difficult cultural obstacle is posed by public agency 
leadership that is truly hostile to the agency’s own mission or 
duty to enforce regulation—in which case neither public nor pri-
vate attorneys would likely want to work with the other. This 
was true to some extent during the Reagan administration,307 
and appears even more so in the current Trump administra-
tion.308 In some cases, this cultural conflict may pose too great 
an obstacle to overcome. Yet even the agency heads most opposed 
to regulation may still pursue limited, select enforcement action, 
creating areas of overlap that provide opportunities for collabo-
ration. For example, even Scott Pruitt—the Trump administra-
tion’s former Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adminis-
trator who was notorious for opposing the EPA and its 
regulations309—initiated enforcement actions against those who 
were the very worst violators of environmental laws, Superfund 
sites.310 A trend toward deregulation and limited enforcement 
budgets may be the new norm, but it need not entirely preclude 
collaboration. Pushing to find areas of overlap where co-enforce-
ment can occur is arguably even more important during deregu-
latory executive administrations, when resources for public en-
forcement are at their lowest.  
Another normative challenge for co-enforcement is that, 
where efforts are combined, public and private enforcers will 
have to give up some amount of their autonomy and resolve any 
 
 306. See also infra Part III.B. 
 307. See, e.g., Burbank & Farhang, supra note 6, at 1552–54 (describing 
Reagan Administration strategy to limit enforcement through “demobiliz[ing] 
the administrative regulatory enforcement apparatus,” while also limiting “pri-
vate enforcement”); supra notes 231–35 and accompanying text. 
 308. See, e.g., supra notes 264–67 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
 310. See, e.g., Civil Cases and Settlements, U.S. EPA, https://cfpub.epa.gov/ 
enforcement/cases/ [https://perma.cc/3DL5-J9KL]. Nevertheless, it is hard to 
imagine a co-counseling arrangement between an EPA led by Scott Pruitt and 
a private plaintiffs’ firm or public interest firm that practices environmental 
law. 
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“turf” issues.311 Public agencies will likely resist having to share 
the lead in litigation, but—as left unaddressed by other scholarly 
proposals312—so, too, will experienced private attorneys. Both 
sides will have to compromise and work out leadership roles 
which, again, can be an advantage as the division of labor could 
allow each side to take the lead for certain tasks making better 
use of resources. Having to work out litigation roles should not 
pose an insurmountable challenge. The same is required by any 
one enforcer acting alone, whether public agency team or a pri-
vate plaintiffs’ firm, any time more than one attorney works on 
the same matter. 
Since a collaborative approach would likely supplement ra-
ther than replace parallel hybrid enforcement, both public and 
private enforcers may also have concerns about being precluded 
in future separate suits or in strategic follow-on suits.313 For ex-
ample, why would a public agency open itself up to future case 
preclusion by private settlement or arbitration? Again, this may 
be a benefit rather than a detriment as both enforcers would be 
involved in the original preclusive suit, so any concerns about its 
future impact could be resolved up front.314 Preclusion may not 
always be bad for enforcers, or be equated with under-enforce-
ment.315 Certain follow-on suits may benefit from the preclusive 
effects of having the strongest enforcement cases resolved 
first.316 And, while not every individual harmed by an entity that 
violates public law may be able to recover, the deterrent effect of 
one strongly prosecuted joint case may do more to encourage le-
gal compliance than many non-preclusive private settlements. 
Lastly, if capture or bias is a theoretical concern of co-en-
forcement,317 self-interested resource preservation is its norma-
tive equivalent. Public and private enforcers, both of whom may 
perceive themselves to be more resource-constrained,318 may be 
 
 311. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 171–72; see also supra notes 103–04 
and accompanying text (discussing lessons from the work of Fine). 
 312. See, e.g., COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 219–
36; Gilles & Friedman, Exploding the Myth, supra note 6, at 116–17; Ru-
benstein, supra note 6, at 2149–55. 
 313. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 323–24. 
 314. See id. at 319–25. 
 315. See id. at 314–17. 
 316. See id. at 329–30. 
 317. See supra notes 158–62 and accompanying text. 
 318. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 309 (“Scholars have argued about whether 
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resistant to share their own limited resources with one another. 
This may be both the biggest hurdle to overcome and the biggest 
potential advantage to public-private co-enforcement. If public 
agency and private attorney enforcers develop trust and working 
collaborative relationships, both stand to gain greatly by lever-
aging additional resources and skilled person-power.319 As de-
scribed further in Part III, co-equal, co-counseled arrangements 
offer the advantage that each half of the enforcement equation 
can primarily fund their own activities, without one side taking 
on a significant financial burden for the other, yet still reaping 
the benefits of the others’ expertise and participation.320 
* * * 
As this Part has shown, considering a move from parallel 
hybrid enforcement to integrated co-enforcement may now be 
necessary to ensure appropriate levels of public law enforce-
ment. Integrating public agency and private plaintiff’s attorney 
enforcement efforts in a co-equal fashion on a subset of key pub-
lic law litigation stands to help overcome the current challenges 
facing each. Public agencies can gain valuable expertise and 
needed litigation resources to fill gaps left in the wake of dereg-
ulatory political pressures. Private plaintiffs’ attorneys can gain 
essential investigatory resources to ensure “plausible” pleading, 
and may be able to leap some hurdles posed by mandatory arbi-
tration and class certification. Yet even if a co-enforcement ap-
proach is both theoretically sound and normatively necessary, 
that does not mean it is doctrinally and practically possible. This 
Article now turns to that task, looking to existing hybrid statutes 
and related case examples to point the way. 
III.  DOCTRINAL & PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE CO-ENFORCEMENT LITIGATION   
Since the rise of federal statutes creating hybrid enforce-
ment schemes in the 1960s,321 federal public agency attorneys 
and private plaintiffs’ attorneys have been litigating on sepa-
rate, parallel tracks to enforce many of the same public laws. 
Yet, as this Part details, there have been moments of overlap and 
 
public or private enforcers are comparatively more resource constrained, but it 
seems reasonable to assume that their resources differ . . . .”). 
 319. See id. at 314–15. 
 320. See infra Part III.B. 
 321. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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coordination that provide the groundwork for greater collabora-
tion. This Part turns to the challenge of how to accomplish inte-
grated public-private co-enforcement partnerships in practice. It 
first analyzes any overarching doctrinal challenges to combined 
enforcement raised by constitutional, statutory, and procedural 
law. It then provides a conceptual framework for how to create 
collaboration, drawing on existing examples of intersection be-
tween public and private enforcers. This Part is intended to pro-
vide an overview that can serve as the basis for future work, 
tracking specific examples of a public-private co-enforcement lit-
igation model. 
A. DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK: CAN WE DO THIS? 
Congress has adopted hybrid enforcement schemes in a wide 
array of federal public law, including environmental, consumer, 
employment, antitrust, and securities protections. The specific 
legal steps required to pursue a co-enforcement approach will re-
quire looking to the specific context—to each federal statute and 
the authority of its enforcement agency. Yet doctrinal challenges 
to co-enforcement are likely to fall into three main areas of con-
cern: constitutional considerations, statutory hurdles, and pro-
cedural constraints. This Section considers the overarching is-
sues arising in each. 
1. Constitutional Doctrine 
Considered broadly, the U.S. Constitution poses no obvious 
obstacles to collaborative public-private enforcement litigation. 
Co-enforcement would combine the efforts of private actors and 
federal agencies both already authorized by Congress to enforce 
federal statutes. Thus, it does not implicate separation of powers 
doctrine, which requires independent authority of each of the 
three branches of government under Articles I through III of the 
U.S. Constitution.322 Article II has been interpreted to vest en-
forcement power for federal law with the executive branch.323 
Yet where Congress enacts a statute that creates a hybrid en-
forcement scheme through litigation by both a federal agency 
controlled by the executive branch and a private right of action 
to individuals, either of which has discretion to litigate cases be-
fore the judiciary, no one branch’s power has been usurped by 
 
 322. See Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1433–39. 
 323. See id. 
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another.324 To the extent that these issues have already been re-
solved in the context of statutes that authorize private attorneys 
general or citizen suits, the same precedent applies.325 Simply 
combining two types of properly vested enforcement authority 
does not change this analysis.326  
It is true that, in a collaborative regime, both public and pri-
vate enforcers would be co-equal, and the public enforcer would 
not be able to quash or totally control the lawsuit.327 Co-enforce-
ment as envisioned by this Article, however, would neither com-
pel a public enforcer to join a case it did not wish to pursue, nor 
to pursue a case in a fashion with which it disagreed. Because 
the federal agency could either decline to pursue a case collabo-
ratively at the outset or withdraw its representation, should 
some insurmountable dispute arise with private attorney co-
counsel over how to pursue the case, the agency would maintain 
its independence.328 
Co-enforcement arrangements also raise no issues with con-
stitutional standing. The federal statutes to which this Article’s 
proposal applies already vest enforcement authority in both a 
 
 324. See id. at 1434–35 (citing and applying cases to her proposal to deputize 
private citizens to bring federal civil rights cases).  
 325. See id. at 1433–39. 
 326. Any perceived conflict here would relate to issues of capture, bias, or 
conflict of interest, which are theoretical and normative problems, not constitu-
tional ones. See supra notes 158–62 and accompanying text. 
 327. This stands in contrast to Gilles’s proposal of delegating authority for 
private attorney civil rights suits, in which she noted: “Private enforcement re-
gimes are vulnerable to separation of powers challenges where the executive 
does not retain sufficient control over the processes of initiating, conducting, 
and terminating litigation. The deputation model . . . provides for genuine exec-
utive ‘control’ . . . through . . . executive power to quash a private . . . suit at any 
stage.” Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1438–39. It also 
stands in contrast to Gilles & Friedman’s proposal of parens patriae suits by 
state AGs using private attorneys, in which the authors explained that, politics 
aside, “there is little to stop state AGs from engaging private law firms on a 
contingent fee basis to pursue claims in parens patriae on behalf of injured state 
residents,” so long as the attorneys general retain “total control over all key 
decision making . . . .” Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 669.  
 328. Because the parties maintain co-equal authority and the private enforc-
ers would not gain “deputized” power through the executive agency, but rather 
maintain it through Congressional enactment, there are also no concerns raised 
by Article II’s Appointments Clause. Compare the private attorney as agent 
model of Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6, at 1442–49. 
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federal agency created by the statute and in citizen plaintiffs em-
powered through a private right of action.329 As required by Su-
preme Court interpretation of Article III, a private attorney gen-
eral must demonstrate its interest in enforcing the law through 
its own injury-in-fact.330 As proposed, a co-enforcement scheme 
would focus on combining the efforts of federal agencies created 
to enforce statutes with those of private plaintiffs enforcing stat-
utory private rights of action to redress their own injuries—
meaning that each half of the collaborative team would have its 
own independent ground for standing.  
2. Statutory Doctrine 
Beyond constitutional concerns, a second doctrinal chal-
lenge may be any specific barriers to co-enforcement arrange-
ments contained in the text or interpretation of the relevant fed-
eral statute. While a complete analysis of any particular 
arrangement would require a deeper, statute-specific analysis, 
some general principles apply.  
For many federal statutes in which Congress has created a 
hybrid enforcement scheme of federal agency and private right 
of action, it has also authorized intervention by one enforcer in a 
case brought by the other,331 laying the foundation for collabora-
tion. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows 
 
 329. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1) (2012) (“[T]he [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission may bring 
a civil action against any respondent . . . . [I]f within [the relevant time pe-
riod] . . . the Commission has not filed a civil action . . . a civil action may be 
brought against the respondent named in the charge . . . by the person claiming 
to be aggrieved or . . . if such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, 
by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful 
employment practice.”). 
 330. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 6, at 316 n.199 (noting that “citizen-suit 
plaintiffs must show an ‘injury in fact’ to have standing” (citing Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572–78 (1992))); Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 
2145 (noting that, for example, “environmental citizen-suit plaintiffs must show 
their own personal interest in a matter prior to filing suit in federal courts,” 
making them “those who enforce public policy by pursuing their own interests,” 
while “a qui tam relator . . . ha[s] standing derivative of the government’s stand-
ing, an assignee of the government’s interests”). Qui tam suits are beyond the 
scope of this Article’s proposal. 
 331. See, e.g., False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012); 47 U.S.C. 
§ 402 (2012) (FCC decision judicial review); see also Clopton, supra note 6, at 
329 & n.278–79 (providing examples of public intervention in private cases and 
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individual plaintiffs to intervene in an enforcement action 
brought by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) on their behalf, and it allows the EEOC to intervene 
in a case brought privately by plaintiffs.332 After intervention, 
both enforcers continue on in the litigation on behalf of the 
named plaintiffs.333 Likewise, while the Clean Water Act re-
quires a private plaintiff to provide notice to the EPA before fil-
ing a citizen suit and bars private suits for injuries that the EPA 
is “diligently prosecuting,” the Act also allows “any citizen [to] 
intervene as a matter of right” in such a suit.334 For these and 
similar statutes, current law permits joint enforcement. If one 
enforcer may intervene after the lawsuit is filed by the other, 
there is nothing in the statute that should prevent joint enforce-
ment from the outset by creating a co-counseling arrangement 
and filing the case together.335 
For other statutes, however, when the government agency 
intervenes in a private plaintiff ’s lawsuit, it displaces the au-
thority of the private plaintiff. For example, private plaintiffs 
may file lawsuits for violations of the federal Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act without first filing charges with the U.S. Department 
of Labor (DOL).336 If, however, they do file a charge and the DOL 
 
vice versa and noting that “courts have various capabilities that can improve 
coordination between seemingly separate proceedings”).  
 332. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012) (“[T]he Commission may bring a civil 
action against any respondent . . . . The person or persons aggrieved shall have 
the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission . . . . [A] civil 
action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge . . . by the 
person claiming to be aggrieved or . . . if such charge was filed by a member of 
the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the 
alleged unlawful employment practice . . . . [T]he court may . . . permit the Com-
mission . . . to intervene in such civil action upon certification that the case is of 
general public importance.”). 
 333. See, e.g., Bornstein, supra note 28, at 160–62 (discussing the examples 
of Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 673 (5th Cir. 1985); United Tele-
comms., Inc. v. Saffels, 741 F.2d 312, 313–14 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 
U.S. 1060 (1985)). 
 334. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (2012); see also Clopton, supra 
note 6, at 305. 
 335. See infra Part III.B. 
 336. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216–217 (2012); see also 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #44: VISITS TO EMPLOY-
ERS (2015), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs44.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2P7X-T7LQ]. 
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decides to intervene, the agency takes over the case on the plain-
tiff’s behalf, replacing private counsel.337 Similarly, private 
plaintiffs may file a lawsuit under the Telemarketing and Con-
sumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act seeking civil damages 
against a fraudulent telemarketer or an injunction to enforce 
compliance with federal law, but must notify the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) that it has done so, at which point the FTC 
may intervene.338 However, when the FTC or Bureau of Con-
sumer Financial Protection files such a lawsuit, private plain-
tiffs may not institute a suit of their own against the same de-
fendant for the same violation.339 For statutes like these, a truly 
collaborative arrangement may not be possible without first 
amending the rule or reinterpreting the precedent that requires 
plaintiff displacement. Where changing existing rules remains 
impossible, public and private enforcers could still collaborate 
through an arrangement in which the agency hires and dele-
gates its authority to private attorneys, as other scholars have 
proposed.340  
3. Procedural Doctrine 
A final overarching doctrinal concern for co-enforcement is 
whether the procedural constraints on private enforcement 
raised in Part II could somehow nullify the procedural ad-
vantages gained by partnering with public enforcers.341 As 
raised previously, private enforcement efforts have been dramat-
ically hampered by recent Supreme Court precedent intensifying 
 
 337. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216–217; see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 336. 
 338. Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 6104(a)–(b) (2012); see also Clopton, supra note 6, at 304 n.129. 
 339. 15 U.S.C. § 6104(c). The same holds true for state attorneys general who 
bring parens patriae suits on behalf of their citizens for telemarketing fraud. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012). 
 340. See generally Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6 (discussing 
antitrust and securities cases), Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra 
note 6 (private civil rights cases); Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, 
at 668–70 (state parens patriae cases); Rubenstein, supra note 6 (same). 
 341. See supra Part II.A. Gilles & Friedman raised similar concerns when 
proposing state parens patriae actions to overcome compelled individual arbi-
tration. See Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 664–68 (“To what 
extent do the challenges that have hobbled class actions pose a threat to parens 
patriae actions? . . . As enforceable class action waivers proliferate, we think it 
is only a matter of time until a defendant makes the argument that a state AG’s 
parens patriae action is barred by the uniform terms of the contracts between 
the defendant and the AG’s constituent consumers and workers.”). 
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pleading standards, limiting class actions, and increasingly com-
pelling arbitration.342 If public enforcers are not, themselves, 
subject to the same limitations, could they become so by co-coun-
seling with private enforcers? 
First, recent pleading requirements established by the 
Twombly and Iqbal interpretations of Rule 8 pose no doctrinal 
obstacle to co-enforcement arrangements because pleading 
standards are the same whether the lawsuit is filed by a public 
agency or a private attorney.343 This means that, regardless of 
whether a public or a private enforcer files the complaint, the 
complaint itself must now meet the “plausible” pleading stand-
ard.344 Thus, there is no risk that co-counseling with private at-
torneys should impact a public agency’s ability to meet current 
pleading requirements, or vice versa. In fact, as suggested pre-
viously, a collaborative approach may be better than a tradi-
tional parallel enforcement approach when it comes to meeting 
more rigorous pleading requirements.345 Combining private at-
torneys’ outside information with public agencies’ pre-litigation 
investigatory authority will likely improve upon each enforcer’s 
current ability to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim under Twombly and Iqbal.346  
Second, while class action doctrine’s constraints on private 
attorneys do not apply to public agencies, existing intervention 
rules make it possible for public and private enforcers to work 
together on group-based claims without jeopardizing the public 
agency’s procedural advantage. Because private attorneys seek-
ing to pursue class claims must comply with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23, they are directly affected by litigation reform ef-
forts and jurisprudence raising evidentiary standards and mak-
ing it more difficult to certify a class.347 Federal agencies seeking 
to pursue group or “systemic” claims, however, do not have to 
 
 342. See supra Part II.A.  
 343. See supra Part II.A.  
 344. See supra Part II.A.  
 345. See supra Part II.C. 
 346. See supra Part II.C. The one caveat is that, under Iqbal, judges have 
been authorized and encouraged to use their own “judicial experience and com-
mon sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). This allows a slight 
opening for public enforcers to be disadvantaged by partnering with private en-
forcers if a given judge bears animosity toward private class action attorneys, 
but that is not a doctrinal hurdle, per se. 
 347. See supra Part II.A.3. 
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comply with Rule 23. Their statutory enforcement authority al-
lows them to litigate harms on behalf of the public interest with-
out class certification.348 Certainly, private plaintiffs’ attorneys 
could not seek to, themselves, represent a class and simply evade 
Rule 23 requirements by co-counseling with a public agency. 
But, under existing procedures that allow private citizens to in-
tervene in public agency enforcement litigation, a private attor-
ney who represents one or more affected individuals could team 
up with a public agency who represents the public in a case to 
redress the same harm on a group-wide basis.349 So long as the 
private attorney focuses on and seeks compensation for repre-
sentation of their individual clients only, the public and private 
attorneys should be able to work together to develop legal theo-
ries and litigate the case jointly. Thus, pursuing group-based 
claims together may pose a practical challenge for co-enforcers, 
but not necessarily a doctrinal one.  
The third area of private procedural constraint—jurispru-
dence upholding mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments—poses a more complicated challenge for co-enforcement 
arrangements. As with Rule 23, while private parties may be 
compelled to subject their individual claims to arbitration, fed-
eral agencies seeking to pursue the same claims are not similarly 
affected. Even when a business requires its employees, consum-
ers, or others to waive their rights to bring a lawsuit and agree 
to submit any legal claims to arbitration, a federal agency that 
enforces those same rights cannot be so limited because the 
agency was not a party to the arbitration agreement.350  
 
 348. See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 
446 U.S. 318, 320 (1980) (holding that the EEOC did not have to comply with 
Rule 23 to bring its own systemic litigation); see also Bornstein, supra note 28, 
at 154, 160–63; Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 665 (“Absent a 
radical expansion of current doctrine, parens patriae suits are likewise imper-
vious to the increasingly restrictive rules governing class certification.”); cf. id. 
at 668 (“One place where AGs do have to make a Rule 23 showing is where the 
parties wish to endow their settlement with the res judicata reach of a class 
action settlement.”). 
 349. See supra notes 331–35 and accompanying text. 
 350. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 
U.S. 279, 288–90, 298 (2002) (holding that an employer-employee agreement to 
arbitrate employment-related disputes does not bar the EEOC from seeking ju-
dicial relief); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991) 
(noting that arbitration agreements do not preclude the EEOC from bringing 
class-wide suits); see also Bornstein, supra note 28, at 154, 158–60; cf. Gilles & 
Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 664–65 (“Facing parens patriae claims 
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For example, the EEOC is not barred from pursuing employ-
ment discrimination claims on behalf of an employee who files a 
charge with the agency, even if the employee signed a mandatory 
pre-dispute arbitration agreement.351 In 1991, in Gilmer v. In-
terstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the first Supreme Court case to 
hold that discrimination claims could be subject to mandatory 
arbitration, the Court also held that this did not stop employees 
from filing charges with the EEOC.352 Because “the EEOC’s role 
in combating . . . discrimination is not dependent on the filing of 
a charge . . . and it has independent authority to investi-
gate . . . discrimination[,] . . . arbitration agreements [do] not 
preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and 
equitable relief.”353 A decade later, in EEOC v. Waffle House, the 
Court clarified that, when an employee signed an arbitration 
agreement as a condition of getting hired, it did not prevent the 
EEOC from pursuing a discrimination case on his behalf, even 
though he was not an official party to the lawsuit.354 The arbi-
tration clause neither “materially change[d] the EEOC’s statu-
tory function” nor “place[d] any restriction on a nonparty’s choice 
of a judicial forum.”355 Once a charge is filed, the EEOC becomes 
“the master of its own case,” able to seek even victim-specific re-
lief for the non-party who filed the charge where it serves a pub-
lic deterrent purpose: an employer cannot “turn[] what is effec-
tively a forum selection clause into a waiver of [the EEOC’s] 
statutory remedies.”356  
While this means that a public enforcer can pursue litiga-
tion on behalf of groups and even individuals who are, them-
selves, bound by arbitration agreements not to litigate, it does 
 
that might otherwise have been brought by persons that are bound by arbitra-
tion clauses and class action waivers, defendants will argue that agency princi-
ples apply, under which an agent is deemed bound by the arbitration agree-
ments of the principal. But the . . . whole idea behind parens patriae suits is 
that the state has its own interest at stake in the litigation . . . [which] kicks in 
once a sufficient number of its constituents have suffered injury . . . . [C]lass 
waivers, in our view, are unlikely to affect parens patriae suits.” (footnotes omit-
ted)).  
 351. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279; Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; see also Bornstein, 
supra note 28, at 154, 158–60. 
 352. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20, 23–29. 
 353. Id. at 28, 32 (emphasis omitted). 
 354. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 282–86. 
 355. Id. at 288–89.  
 356. Id. at 291–92, 294–95, 298. 
  
880 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:811 
 
foreclose the option of private attorney intervention. In the con-
text of the EEOC, courts have held that any individual plaintiff 
intervenor in an agency action who is covered by a mandatory 
arbitration agreement may be compelled to arbitrate any indi-
vidual cross-claim against the employer.357 For these and other 
areas of hybrid enforcement in which parties may use mandatory 
arbitration agreements,358 true enforcement integration may not 
be possible. Coordination is important, however, as clients re-
quired to arbitrate may seek out private attorneys, who—if they 
believe the case to be of significant public interest—may wish to 
refer the case to the agency to allow for litigation. In these in-
stances, too, a deputization model, as other scholars have pro-
posed, may still offer a means for collaboration.359  
Given the rise of arbitration agreements in certain areas of 
public law, creating a system that encourages communication 
and, where possible, collaboration between public and private 
enforcers is essential to ensuring any adequate level of enforce-
ment. Otherwise, those forced to arbitrate their statutory claims 
individually may simply give up.  
B. PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK: HOW DO WE DO THIS? 
Assuming that all doctrinal hurdles can be overcome so that 
a co-enforcement arrangement is possible as a matter of law, the 
final question is how to implement it in practice. This Section 
suggests that, while achieving a co-equal collaborative public-
private model of enforcement will require a cultural shift among 
enforcers that should not be underestimated, it is otherwise a 
simple endeavor as a matter of practice. If public agency and pri-
vate plaintiffs’ attorneys are willing to try to bridge the divide, a 
co-enforcement arrangement can be created and managed, for 
 
 357. See Bornstein, supra note 28, at 160 n.238 (citing Equal Emp’t Oppor-
tunity Comm’n v. Woodmen of World Life Ins. Soc’y, 479 F.3d 561, 568–70, 568 
n.2 (8th Cir. 2007)). 
 358. Note that, while arbitration agreements are common in employment, 
consumer, and banking contexts, there are many areas of hybrid enforcement 
in which this doctrinal hurdle will not arise, posing no obstacle to public-private 
co-enforcement—including the environment, housing, education, securities, and 
more.  
 359. See generally Coffee, Rescuing the Private AG, supra note 6 (antitrust 
and securities cases); Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6 (pri-
vate civil rights cases); Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 6, at 668–70 
(state parens patriae cases); Rubenstein, supra note 6 (antitrust and securities 
cases). 
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the most part, by a well-planned co-counseling agreement and 
open communication. This Section provides a framework for how 
to build a collaborative model, considering four practical areas: 
forming a co-enforcement team, dividing up work, resolving con-
flicts, and financing the litigation. Because the specifics of any 
co-enforcement litigation model will depend on the statute and 
agency involved, this Section aims to lay the groundwork upon 
which future work examining specific co-enforcement litigation 
may be built. 
1. Forming a Public-Private Co-Enforcement Team 
A proposal for integrated enforcement is not designed to re-
place separate parallel hybrid enforcement, but, instead, to sup-
plement it at a time of unprecedented constraints on both enforc-
ers. For this reason, co-enforcement arrangements could be 
entered into selectively for cases that most warrant a collabora-
tive approach. Public agencies could develop an assessment tool 
to determine in which types of cases to seek private co-counsel 
based on relevant criteria—for example, cases the agency esti-
mates will require over a certain amount of financial resources 
or for which there are known individual victims with private 
standing. All federal public agencies currently face far greater 
demand for enforcement than their resources can cover, so they 
already engage in case evaluation to select which of those cases 
to litigate.360 Each agency could decide on additional criteria that 
triggers them to seek private co-counsel and add this to their ex-
isting rubric.  
Likewise, private attorneys usually engage in routinized 
case intake to assess whether to accept a plaintiff ’s case.361 Each 
firm could identify and add to their existing intake and decision-
making process criteria for when to approach the relevant 
agency to co-counsel—for example, when pre-litigation investi-
gation or class certification poses a difficult challenge, or when a 
suit warrants litigation but individual plaintiffs are covered by 
 
 360. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, EN-
FORCEMENT MANUAL 5 (2017); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., ANTI-
TRUST DIVISION MANUAL ch. III, at 7 (5th ed. 2012) https://www.justice 
.gov/atr/file/761141/download [https://perma.cc/J2TG-YZVR] (last updated Apr. 
2018); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE RE-
PORT 18 (2006). 
 361. See, e.g., Will a Lawyer Take My Case?, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS, 
https://www.workplacefairness.org/takecase [https://perma.cc/ZM3Z-CNHB]. 
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mandatory arbitration agreements.362 Moreover, because many 
federal statutes with hybrid enforcement schemes allow the 
other enforcement entity to intervene,363 public agencies and pri-
vate attorneys could draw on their existing processes for deter-
mining whether to intervene when deciding whether to co-coun-
sel, but do so before the complaint is filed—in effect “pre”-
intervening.  
Once co-enforcement case criteria are established, either 
public or private enforcement attorneys could broach the idea of 
creating a collaborative team for a particular case based on ex-
isting relationships. In addition, or instead, public enforcers 
could reach out to the relevant private bar to establish a panel 
of private attorneys with whom they could seek to regularly co-
counsel. Neither option would require reinventing the wheel; in 
many areas of federal statutory enforcement, there are a limited 
set of national nonprofit public interest organizations and pri-
vate law firms that handle a significant portion of enforcement 
meant to serve the public interest.364 Establishing a set group of 
co-counsels would also reduce transaction costs of co-enforce-
ment over time, given that once a co-counseling agreement is 
created, the parties involved may more easily replicate it for fu-
ture cases.  
Of course, any process for how an agency selects co-counsel 
would need to be transparent and ensure against favoritism to 
avoid “pay-to-play” concerns raised by other scholars’ proposals 
for deputization schemes.365 But because each half of a co-equal 
 
 362. See supra notes 348–56 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra notes 331–35 and accompanying text. 
 364. See, e.g., Rankings: Most Feared Plaintiffs Firms, LAW360, https:// 
www.law360.com/rankings/most-feared-plaintiffs-firms [https://perma.cc/LH29 
-RFG2]; The Top 50 of 2018, ISS, https://www.issgovernance.com/library/the 
-top-50-of-2018/ [https://perma.cc/75L2-KLU4]; Public Interest Law Firms, 
YALE LAW SCHOOL, https://law.yale.edu/student-life/career-development/ 
students/career-guides-advice/public-interest-law-firms [https://perma.cc/32YS 
-CAQ3]; Private Public Interest and Plaintiff’s Firm Guide, HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL, https://hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/private-public-interest-law-and 
-plaintiffs-firm-guide/ [https://perma.cc/4QC3-LSUK].  
 365. See supra Part II.C; see also Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 
6, at 670–71 (applying a similar rationale to their suggestion of more State AG 
parens patriae cases, with outsourcing to private attorneys: “The public-private 
partnership model, properly implemented, has the potential to replace th[e] un-
seemly scrum [of private law firms vying for lead counsel position] with a trans-
parent process, in which the AGs select their cocounsel in conformity with what-
ever state laws and practices might exist governing state contracting . . . [and] 
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co-enforcement team would be responsible for generating its own 
funding, this would be a less onerous burden. While critics could 
still raise concerns that agencies are directing business to cer-
tain private co-counsel, there would be no public funds going to 
those attorneys.366  
2. Dividing Work 
Once a public-private team is formed, and assuming there is 
no specific statutory bar to a co-equal relationship, most other 
issues can be resolved by a clear and detailed co-counseling 
agreement. Indeed, as documented in recent legal scholarship, 
the judiciary is increasingly accepting of and deferential to pri-
vately arranged procedure.367 Unless a relevant statute imposes 
a barrier, how co-counsel divides work can be a matter of private 
contract.  
Again, creating a co-enforcement co-counseling agreement 
should not require starting from scratch: enforcers could look to 
existing models and arrangements they already use when work-
ing with other attorneys. For example, many, if not most, com-
plex private class actions are brought by multiple plaintiffs’ at-
torneys or firms working together, sometimes with the pro bono 
department of a defense or corporate firm.368 Such arrangements 
already contemplate things like whether there will be a lead 
counsel, which firms or attorneys are responsible for which case 
duties, responsibilities of each to include the other in strategic 
decisions, and so on.369 Likewise, many federal agencies engage 
in agreements with other state or federal agencies with whom 
they share overlapping enforcement authority. For example the 
EEOC establishes a work-sharing agreement with each state 
 
act[ ]  as a filter . . . against unmeritorious cases on which private lawyers might 
otherwise [pursue] in order to exploit in terrorem effects.”). 
 366. See infra Part III.B.4. 
 367. See, e.g., Robin J. Effron, Ousted: The New Dynamics of Privatized Pro-
cedure and Judicial Discretion, 98 B.U. L. REV. 127, 128–39 (2018). 
 368. For example, in the Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. class action lawsuit 
alleging sex discrimination under federal Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, fifteen different attorneys from five different law firms and four non-profit 
organizations were listed as counsel of record for plaintiffs. See Brief for Re-
spondents, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (No. 10-277), 
2011 WL 686407. 
 369. See, e.g., Model Co-Counseling Agreements, ASS’N OF PRO BONO COUN-
SEL (Jan. 21, 2015), https://apbco.org/model-co-counseling-agreements/ [https:// 
perma.cc/VX3X-QALJ].  
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Fair Employment Practices Agency that enforces antidiscrimi-
nation law.370 And the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department 
of Justice has established procedures for how to work jointly and 
cooperatively with other public agencies with whom their re-
sponsibilities overlap, including both the FTC and the antitrust 
divisions of state attorneys general.371 
By starting with existing co-counseling or work-sharing 
agreements and negotiating any additional issues at the outset, 
public and private enforcers can likely resolve how to divide re-
sponsibilities, as well as establish a process for making any fu-
ture decisions throughout joint litigation.372 
3. Resolving Conflicts 
Similarly, collaborative enforcement teams could work to 
anticipate and resolve up front any likely sources of conflict that 
may arise. Existing co-counsel agreements each enforcer uses 
with other attorneys or agencies likely also provide examples of 
resolutions to known conflicts. For example, model co-counseling 
agreements from the Association of Pro Bono Counsel include 
clauses addressing issues that could lead co-counsel to clash, 
such as priorities related to settlement, liability for any sanc-
tions imposed, and contact with the media.373 More importantly, 
the co-counseling agreement could establish procedures for re-
solving any conflicts that may arise in the future—for example, 
submitting any unresolved conflict to mediation or arbitration, 
or agreeing to abide by a named plaintiff/client’s decision.374  
 
 370. See, e.g., Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs) and Dual Filing, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/ 
fepa.cfm [https://perma.cc/RCR4-7BFX]; FY 2012 EEOC/FEPA Model Work-
sharing Agreement, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www 
.eeoc.gov/employees/fepa_wsa_2012.cfm [https://perma.cc/BEU9-LSFR]. 
 371. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL 
ch. VII, at 3–29 (5th ed. Nov. 2012), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761161/ 
download [https://perma.cc/C8U6-4YU8]. 
 372. Enforcement does not have to mean litigation, but mediated settle-
ments or arbitration should have a class/systemic component or injunctive relief 
that the presence of the public agency can ensure post-Concepcion. For a dis-
cussion of how federal agencies are responding to mandatory arbitration, see 
generally Daniel T. Deacon, Agencies and Arbitration, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 991 
(2017). 
 373. See, e.g., Model Co-Counseling Agreements, supra note 369. 
 374. See, e.g., id. 
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Another potential conflict involves ethical duties to each en-
forcer’s “client”—a challenge that, once resolved, may in fact be 
a strength of co-equal, collaborative enforcement. In a co-en-
forcement arrangement, the private plaintiffs’ attorney will be 
duty-bound first to the individual named client or clients who 
brought the case, while the public agency will be first responsible 
to the public interest. Once again, this is nothing new to experi-
enced attorneys, who must strike similar balances often, for ex-
ample, when two attorneys represent multiple parties in the 
same case, or even when a single attorney faces a settlement of-
fer that will cover their costs or achieve their goals but fall short 
of the client’s desires. 
For many, if not most, cases, particularly those pursued as 
a class action or systemic litigation, these interests will largely 
overlap. The individual plaintiff ’s interests may be best served 
by both a damage award and injunctive relief to correct and deter 
future harm by the defendant; the public’s interests are repre-
sented by the individual plaintiff, who is a member of the injured 
public. Both public and private enforcers play a role in both com-
pensation and deterrence.375 And it is exactly where individual 
victim interests and the larger public interests diverge, that co-
enforcement may offer its greatest reward. To the extent that 
private enforcement of public law has been subject to the criti-
cism that it creates “agency costs,”376 the ethical duties of public 
enforcer co-counsel can provide a check on private attorney “en-
trepreneurialism,” to ensure that enforcement is truly serving 
both harmed individuals and the public to which they belong. 
4. Financing Litigation 
The final and most complicated element of putting co-en-
forcement arrangements into practice is how to finance the liti-
gation. Generally speaking, public enforcement litigation is 
funded through the federal agency’s budget, with the focus of the 
recovery being injunctive relief and damages that go to the in-
jured public, whereas private plaintiffs’ attorneys fund their lit-
igation through a combination of attorneys’ fees allowed by stat-
ute and contingency fees for a portion of plaintiffs’ damages 
 
 375. See supra notes 76–80, 154–57 and accompanying text. 
 376. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
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award.377 Yet this is not always the case. Some federal statutes 
allow public agencies to seek reimbursement through fines, fees, 
or a portion of damages recovered, too.378 Funding arrangements 
for co-enforcement litigation would have to be statute-specific, 
made in accordance with any statutory requirements limiting 
litigation damages to the public agency. That said, so long as all 
attorney time is tracked and all monies collected and distributed 
according to the law, there is nothing to stop each enforcer from 
seeking reimbursement for the portion of work they did on the 
case in the manner in which they usually do so.  
Should a statute forbid public agency collection of attorneys’ 
fees, co-enforcement provides a significant advantage over other 
proposals for agency oversight of private attorneys general379: 
because the enforcers act as co-equal co-counsel, the private at-
torney is not acting as the “agent” of the “principal” public 
agency, so should not be limited from seeking attorneys’ fees for 
its own documented work.  
Once determined up front, any financing arrangement, too, 
could be clarified and enforced through a co-counseling agree-
ment. For example, both enforcers could agree to cover their own 
costs and expenses incurred for their portion of work on the case 
and could detail a method of recordkeeping for attorney work 
hours.380 Each could then use those records to access financing 
in their usual fashion: the agency incurring costs and fees al-
lowed by their budget, private attorneys seeking attorneys’ fees 
for their portion from the court should they prevail in the litiga-
tion. Both parties would be responsible for financing their own 
portion of work just as they do when multiple private firms co-
counsel, more than one public agency enforces the same case, or 
a private party intervenes in a federal agency action or vice 
versa. 
* * * 
From a doctrinal standpoint, the Constitution and most hy-
brid statutes, themselves, pose no constraints to co-enforcement, 
 
 377. See Clopton, supra note 6, at 309 (noting that “some funding mecha-
nisms (e.g., alternative litigation financing and contingency fees) are not 
equally available to public and private parties”).  
 378. See generally id. at 309 n.158. 
 379. See generally COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 
219–36; Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform, supra note 6; Gilles & Fried-
man, After Class, supra note 6, at 623; Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 2129. 
 380. See, e.g., Model Co-Counseling Agreements, supra note 369. 
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and collaboration may be possible despite recent procedural ju-
risprudence. From a practical standpoint, processes for case se-
lection, division of labor, and litigation financing can likely be 
developed from existing tools through co-counseling agreements. 
The biggest challenge to implementing co-enforcement, then, is 
overcoming professional cultures to build trust and collaboration 
between public agency and private plaintiffs’ attorneys who, de-
spite working on the same side of civil law enforcement, may 
have reservations about each other’s motivations or practices. 
This is no small challenge, but it is also not insurmountable. Pri-
vate law firms have long co-counseled with one another; state 
and federal government agencies collaborate when their enforce-
ment authority overlaps; and many public and private enforcers 
are permitted to intervene in each other’s cases. There are exist-
ing models from which to draw guidance on how to integrate ef-
forts, and, once public and private enforcers establish one collab-
orative co-equal partnership, they should be able to replicate it. 
Most importantly, given their current limitations, public and pri-
vate enforcers may no longer have a choice but to work together, 
to ensure that the federal rights they both seek to protect are 
adequately enforced. 
  CONCLUSION   
The efforts of both halves of what Congress intended to be 
two-pronged, overlapping enforcement regimes for federal public 
laws have now become seriously constrained. In a series of pro-
cedural decisions over the past decade, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has limited the ability of private plaintiffs’ attorneys to pursue 
class actions and, indeed, the very access to federal courts they 
need to pursue enforcement litigation.381 During the same time 
period, an economic crisis launched a fervent political movement 
asserting new pressure to reduce public agency enforcement, ex-
acerbated by recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions unlocking un-
limited campaign contributions by those subject to regulation.382 
The time is ripe for public and private attorney enforcers to con-
sider combining forces. 
Other scholars have proposed creating greater oversight by 
public agencies acting as “principals” who delegate or outsource 
the work of enforcement litigation to private attorney “agents,” 
 
 381. See supra Part II.A. 
 382. See supra Part II.B. 
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either to ensure access to the courts, or to curb the profit moti-
vations of private attorneys.383 Yet this is an arrangement that 
may not appeal to private plaintiffs’ attorneys, many of whom 
have a deep commitment to the public interest and significant 
litigation expertise and successes. Moreover, this “deputization” 
model would require a level of resources and capacity for over-
sight that public agencies now lack.  
A public-private co-enforcement approach, in which private 
attorneys and public agencies share leadership and resources co-
equally, would combine each enforcer’s procedural and practical 
advantages while balancing their cultures and motivations.384 A 
proposal to adopt co-enforcement is not intended to supplant the 
current model of separate, parallel enforcement. Instead, it is of-
fered to supplement and enhance existing hybrid regimes for sig-
nificant cases, to bolster the efforts of each enforcer currently 
acting alone.  
A collaborative, co-enforcement approach is not a panacea. 
It will not resolve entirely a lack of federal agency support or 
resources, nor will it reopen the courthouse doors that have now 
been closed to private plaintiffs. And it will require enforcers to 
rethink how they have done things in the past, to overcome ex-
isting cultural norms, and to share leadership over certain cases. 
But, in an era of both shrinking private access to federal courts 
and intense political and economic pressure away from public 
regulation, public-private co-enforcement litigation may now be 
a necessity.  
 
 
 383. See supra notes 107–17 and accompanying text. 
 384. See supra Parts I.B, II.C. 
